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Federal/Civil

Timely(with ext.) ~

The FCC seeks review of a decision

ovcrtur~in g

..

its order defining, and prohibiting the broadcast of, "indecent
"""-'"'

"'-"'

.........

~'

language."
::wa-r--

2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

At about 2:00p.m. on

October 20, 1973, radio station WBAI in New York City, which
is licensed to resp, broadcast a pre-recorded monologue by
( .

comedian George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words."

r

~o&4tJ de~y t/t.is

pefftialt '

$eat

The monologue,

lasf

paoe.

~

2.

~/

a transcript of which is printed in Pet.App. 58-62, is built
around the seven words that in Mr. Carlin's view cannot be

1/
used over the air or in polite society.-

On December 3, 1973

the FCC received a complaint about the airing of this monologue
from a man who was riding in a car with his young son when it
was playedo
The FCC forwarded the complaint to WBAI with a request for
comments.

The station responded that the monologue had been

played as part of a program dealing with "contemporary society's
attitudes toward language" and that listeners had been advised
before the monologue was played that it contained language that
might be offensive to some.

The FCC then instituted a proceeding

to determine whether the language broadcast was "obscene,
indecent, or profane" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1464.

If

it was, the FCC is empowered to revoke the station's license,
impose a monetary forfeiture, or issue a cease and desist order.
47

u.s.c.

§§312(a), 312(b), 503(b)(l)(E).

At the conclusion of its proceeding, the FCC issued what
it labeled a "declaratory order" in which it defined "indecent
language" for purposes of §1464.

"Indecent language," the

Commission said, is "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children

I

1. Carlin lists "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits." Pet.App. 58.

3.

c

Fet.App. 70-71.
may be in the audience." /The Corrnnission said such language
is distinct from "obscene language in that (1) it lacks the
element of appeal to the prurient interest, •.• and that
(2) when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed
by a claUn that it has literary, artistic, political or
scientific value."

Pet.App. 71.

The Commission left open

the possibility that,'\fuen the number of children in the audience is reduced
to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours,
a different . standard might conceivably be used. The
definition of indecent would remain the same •..• However,
we would also consider whether the material has serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value .•.. "
Pet.App. 71.
In stating this definition, the Commission asserted that
"the broadcast medium is not subject to the same analysis that
might be appropriate for other, less intrusive forms of
expression" for four reasons: "(1) children have access to
radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio
receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy
interest is entitled to extra deference, ... (3) unconsenting
adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive
language is being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a
scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must
therefore license in the public interest." Pet.App. 69.

The

Commission said that its first reason was of greatest concern
to it, and that its definition was intended to channel offensive
language away from time slots when children might hear it.

l

Id. 69-70.

4.

Applying its definition of "indecent language" to the
case before it, the Commission held that Carlin's seven words

all were indecent "as broadcast."

Pet.App. 72.

Rather than

imposing sanctions on the station, however, the Commission said
it was issuing a "declaratory order ... to clarify the standard
which the Commission utilizes to judge 'indecent language.' "
Id., at 73. The Commission did state that the order would be
"associated with the station's license file" for reference irt
the event future complaintswere filed against the station.
Commissioner Reid filed a concurring statement in which
she said the Commission's "standards do not go far enough"
because the language at issue is "totally inappropriate for
broadcast at any time." Pet.App. 79.

Commissioner QUello filed

a concurring statement expressing the same sentiment: "Garbage

is garbage." Pet.App. 80.
5"""""11:.

Commissioner Robinson, joined by

.......

Commissioner Hooks, filed a concurring statement in which he
defended the majority's approach despite some First Amendment
doubts.

Pet.App. 81-92.

Following issuance of the Commission's order, the Radio
Television News Directors Association filed a motion for
clarification or reconsideration seeking a ruling that the
Commission "does not intend to apply its definition of indecent
language so as to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent words
which might otherwise be reported as a part of a bona fide
news or public affairs program." Pet.App. 94.

The Association

s.
pointed out that "in some cases, public events likely to produce
offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity
for journalistic editing." Id., at 95 n.l.

The Commission

responded that it had not absolutely prohibited the broadcast
of indecent language, but only sought to "channel" it to hours
when children were unlikely to be listening; that it probably
would be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for indecent
language used during a live broadcast of a news event; and that
it would not comment on any other hypothetical situations posed
~y

the Association.
The D.C. Cir. reversed the Commission's order.

Judge Tamm

thought, first, that the order collided with 47 U.S.C. §326, which
states that "no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication."

In his view, the

defect in the order's definition of "indecent language" was that
it did not take into account whether a "broadcast containing
such words may have serious artistic, literary, political or
scientific value ••. "In particular, it would ban the broadcast
"of many great works of literature including Shakespearian
plays
,_,
,_.
~

....

..............

.._. ...--.

......

and contemporary plays which have won critical acclaim, the
works of renowned classical and contemporary poets and writers,

2/

and passages from the Bible." -

This censorship was bey·ond the

Commission's power as restricted by §326.
2. Later in the opinion he cites as examples Shakespeare's
The Tempest and the "works of Auden, Becket, Lord Byron, Chaucer,
Fielding, Greene, He ngway,
ce, Knowles, Lawrence, Onvell, .
Scott, Swift and t e Nixon tapes "Pet.App. 15 n.l9.

·W.n.Af /

6.

(

Given this conclusion, Judge Tamm thought it unnecessary to
decide whether the term "indecent" in §1464 could be defined to
include matter that was not "obscene."

Even if the Commission

had the power, in the face of the First Amendment, to prohibit
the broadcast of speech that is not constitutionally obscene,
"the statute or order instituting such a ban must not be overbroad
of!ovague."

This order suffered from both defects.

It was overbroad

because it banned the broadcast of works of serious value, and it
was vague because it did not define what age children the
Commission thought it was necessary to protect.

Pet.App. 13-15.

Chief Judge Bazelon filed a concurring opinion.

He thought

the Commission's definition of "indecent language" was "massively
overbroad" under the First Amendment as interpreted in Miller v.
California, 414 U.S. 81 (1973).

First, indecency was to be

tested under "contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium" rather than under "local community standards." Second,
appeal to the prurient interest was no~o be considered.
a work was not to be judged as a whole.

Third,

And finally, a work

could not be redeemed by serious value.
Judge Bazelon then considered and rejected the Commission's
arguments that speech protected in other media might constitutionally
be prohibited in the broadcast media.

The argument that broadcasts

intrude on privacy interests, especially in the home, fell mainly
because a listener can escape by turning off the radio.

The

argument that regulation of indecent language was necessary to
protect children fell for a number of reasons.

Conceding that

7.

the Commission might have greater power to regulate speech aimed
at children than at adults, Judge Bazelon thought the order was
objectionable because it reduced the listening fare of adults
with normal sleeping habits to that fit only for children.

The

Commission should have made a greater effort to protect the
adults' rights, and should have erred i.n the direction of underregulation.

Moreover, the Commission's order rested on the

unproven premises that most parents do not want their

children tf~

to hear any indecent language and that most parents are unable~
to control their children's radio listening habits.

~s~ ~hat:: :the Co~ission ~

And the

the power to =;revent

~

~

chi~

from hearing non-obscene language because of the parents' wishes
was inherently boundless, justifying censorship of anything else

(_;

parents might not want their children to hear.

Finally, the.

Commission's order was not justifiable on the ground that broadcast
channels are scarce, for §326 reflects a Congres.s ional judgment agains t
content regulation on this ground.
Judge Leventhal dissented, emphasizing that despite the
generality of the Commission's standard, it had only decided
that the monologue broadcast by resp was indecent "as broadcast"
at 2 p.m. in the afternoon.

Taking issue with Judge Bazelon,

Judge Leventhal thought that the Commission's definition of
"indecent langauge" reflected the same underlying considerations
as this Court's definition of "obsce~y" in Miller. In particular,
Miller had expanded "obscenity" to include "patently offensive
-,.

representations of • . • • excretory functions," which was the only

8.

kind of non-prurient material covered by the Commission's
definition.

In any event, the fact that radio intrudes into

the home, and its easy accessibility to children, warrant the
Commission's special sensitivity to the problem at hand.

If

the order is overbroad because it bans "indecent" speech that
has serious value and is broadcast in evening hours when children
are likely to be under parental control, the court should wait
for a case presenting that set of facts to so hold.
D.C. Cir. denied rehearing

~

bane, Judges Leventhal,

MacKinnon, Robb, and Wilkey dissenting.
3. CONTENTIONS:

The FCC contends that cert should be granted

in order to decide whether the unique qualities of the broadcast
media justify its definition and proscription of "indecent"
language.

It relies especially upon expresiions of this Court

suggesting that broadcast media present special First Amendment

-

problems; upon the need to protect children from language of the
kind covered by its order; and upon the need to preserve to parents
the decision whether their children will hear such language.
The Commission also points to the wide divergence of views on D.C.
Cir., and it

contend~

that

Jud~

-

-

-- - -------

Leventhal's narrow focus on the

case at hand was more appropriate than the majority's "overbreadth"
approach.

Finally, it contends that the problem is ripe for

review because it has been receiving increasing numbers of complains
complaints in recent years and has been grappling with the problem
for some time.

9.

Resp replies that cert should be denied because the narrow
holding below - that the Commission's order is overbroad under
§326 - clearly is correct.

In particular, the order bans the

use of non-obscene words without regard to their context.

In

addition, no important issue of federal law is presented, as
is demonstrated by the

.

Justice Department's decision not to

support the Commission's petition for cert.

The D.C. Cir. did

not decide whether non-obscene speech ever could be banned on
the broadcast media, but rather held that assuming it can, the
order was overbroad.

And the court did not even reach the

question whether this particular monologue was "indecent" within
the meaning of §1464.
4. DISCUSSION:

Because of the legislative nature of the

Commission's order and the divergence of views on D.C. Cir.,
this case comes here in rather an unfocused state.

Judge Tamm

thought the order was overbroad under §326, Judge Bazelon
thought it was overbroad under the First Amendment, and Judge
Leventhal thought the order was permissible at least as applied:
But even he may be ready to concede that the order is invalid
in other situations.
Although this is an area into which the Court has not
ventured before, it seems likely that the Commission's approach,
with its focus on words,rather than on words and context,
was not sufficiently discerning even taking into account the
special problems of the broadcast media.

The Commission made

it quite clear that a broadcast's claim to serious merit
would make no difference in determining whether it was
"indecent" except, perhaps, if the broadcast were late at
night.

As Judge Tamm pointed out, this would keep a fair

number of serious works off the air at times when most
adults could listen.

Even granting validity to the

Commission's "channeling" approach, one would think that it
might have taken into account both the adults' interest in
access to such works, and the possibility that children
could be shielded from them.
The question of airing Carlin's monologue at 2 p.m.

l

presents a more difficult question, but it no longer is at
the center of this codTroversy.

The Commission decided

not to impose sanctions for the broadcast, and both judges
in the majority effectively ignored the issue.

Given the

-----------------~--~-----~------------breadth
of the declaratory portion of the Commission's

order, and its potential chilling effect on broadcasters,
the majority's overbreadth approach seems more
than the dissenter's as-applied approach.

appropr~ate

Thus, unless the

: '

Court is incli ned to review the majority i s overbreadth
holding, the case probably is not worth taking.
There is a response.
12-13-77
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BENCH MEMO
To: Mr. Justice Powell

April 17, 1978

From: Jim Alt
No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.
I. INTRODUCTION.
A. The Order Under Review.

The facts and decisions below

stated adequately in the Preliminary Memo, which I wrote.
recap briefly, 18

u.s.c.

§

a~e

To

1464 prohibits the broadcast of "obscene,

indecent, or profane language."

In the course of considering a

listener complaint about respondent's broadcast of a George Carlin
monologue, the FCC issued what it labeled a "Declaratory Order"
in which it defined "indecent" language as follows:

" '[I]ndecent • • • language • . . describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs, at times of the day when there is
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."
App. 15.

The FCC explicitly distinguished the "indecent" from

the "obscene":
"[I]ndecent language is distinguished from obscene language
in that (1) it lacks the element of appeal to the prurient
interest, • • . and that (2) when children may be in the
audience, it cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has
literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
Ibid.

The FCC hinted, although it did not hold, that "indecent"

language might be broadcast!
"[w]hen the number of children in the audience is reduced
to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours . • •
[if] the material has serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value • . • [and if the broadcaster makes]
substantial and solid efforts to warn unconsenting adults
who do not want the type of language in this case thrust
into the sanctuary of their home." Id., at 15-16.
The FCC listed four reasons why material that is not
constitutionally obscene might be censored when broadcast:
"(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the
home, a place where people's privacy is entitled to extra
deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970);
(3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any
,
warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcist;
and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of
which the government must therefore license in the public
interest." Id., at 13.

The FCC analogized "indecent" language to a "public nuisance,"
and said that its aim was to "channel" such language into time
slots when children would be unlikely to hear it.Id., at 14.
as
The FCC concluded with a statement that "the langua,.e/broadcast
was indecent and prohibited by 18

u.s.c.

1464."

Id., at 17. It did

not, however, impose any sanctions, stating:
"There are several reasons why we are issuing a declaratory
order instead of a notice of apparent liability • • • A
declaratory order is a flexible procedural device admirably
suited to terminate the present controversy between a
listener and the station, and to clarify the standards
which the Commission utilizes to judge 'indecent language.'
[cites] Such an order will permit all persons who consider
themselves aggrieved or who wish to call additional factors
to the Commission's attention to seek reconsideration. [cite]
If not satisfied by the Commission's action on reconsideration,
judicial review may be sought immediately." Ibid.
B.

~~e is! ue that divides the parties is _whether

the statutory and constitutional validity of the Order should
be considered on its face, or as applied.

The two judges in

the majority below took the former view, while the dissenter took
the latter.

For the reasons stated in

consider the Order on its face.

Part ~

infra, I would

Even if it is considered as applied,

however, its validity is not free from doubt.
@

The second

iss~ is

whether the term "indecent" in Section

1464 can be construed to mean anything other than what is
constitutionally obscene.

For the reasons stated in PartlX% infra,

I conclude that it can.

~e ~ird is~ue

is whether the FCC's construction of §

146~'~

proscription of "indecent" language, either on its face or as
applied, violates the First Amendment rights of broadcasters or
listeners.

For the reasons stated in Part I V infra,

I would

conclude that, although the FCC may ban the use of some "indecent"
language that is not constitutionally obscene, it has taken too
indiscriminate an approach to the problem.

II. HOW TO VIEW THE ORDER.
Perhaps the fundamental point that divided Judges Tamm and
Bazelon from Judge Leventhal was whether the validity of the
Order should be judged by the general rules that it purports to
declare, or by the application of those rules to the specific

1/

complaint that was before the FCC.-

Likewise, in this Court

Pacifica and the SG argue that the Order should be judged by
its general rules, while the FCC urges that it should be judged as
applied.
Although I have a great deal of respect for Judge Leventhal,
I disagree with him on this issue.

My reasons are these:

1. The express intent of the Order is to lay down general
rules that will govern broadcasters' conduct in the future.
Although the FCC did not follow the formal procedures for agency
rulemaking, it invited all interested parties to submit their
comments in the form of petitions for reconsideration and to seek
immediate judicial review of the Order. In addition, when this
case was on review before the CADC panel, the FCC apparently did
!!£!argue that its Order should be considered "as applied." See
Brief for Pacifica at 19 n. 16. Finally, even though the FCC now
argues that the Order should be considered as applied, it also
admits its intent "to issue a declaratory order that would guide
the public and broadcast licensees." Brief for FCC at 44; accord,
Reply Brief for FCC at 5-6.

In this situation, it strikes me as

highly unrealistic to say that all the FCC did was decide one

1. Even Judge . Leventhal· expressed do~bts as to the general rules
that the FCC announced. See App. 104-106. In particular, he
doubted the validity of the rules as they might be applied to
p,rgadnas~s in the rarly evening, and the inclusion of the word
t1ts
1n the FCC s l1st of prohibited words.

particular case - especially in view of the fact that it did not
even apply any sanctions in that particular case.
2. If the new general rules sweep too broadly - as even
Judge Leventhal thought they may, see note 1, supra - they will
function to deter constitutionally protected speech.

I believe

that Judge Leventhal did not give this consideration sufficient
weight.

Although I realize that you are no great fan of overbreadth

analysis, I would urge that, at least in the first instance, you
consider whether the rules are "substantially overbroad," and hence
subject to facial invalidation.
422 U.S. 216-217 (1975).

See Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville,

I feel rather strongly that if the rules

go too far, the broadcasters of the nation should not have to live
with the cloud of FCC enforcement hanging over them.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF § 1464.
Pacifica contends that the ·term "indecent language" in § 1464
should, as a matter of statutory construction, be limited to
language that is constitutionally obscene.

It relies on United

States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973),
and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974), where th~ '
Court construed 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1461, and 1305(a), which
prohibit the importation and mailing of 'b.bscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy, or vile" articles, to encompass only what is
constitutionally obscene, in order to avoid void-for-vagueness
attacks.

It also points out that in United States v. Simpson,

561 F.2d 53 (CA7 1977), the court, relying on 12 200-Foot Reels,
held that § 1464's definition of "indecent" should be limited to

...

6•

I~Yf ~.e.~cJ ~

, • LA-«Jc-< ~J' ~ ~~~
the constitutionally obscene.

~

•

The FCC and the SG reply that the Court in 12 200-foot Reels
and Hamling made no reference to § 1464, and did not purport to
decide what its use of "indecent" means.

Moreover, § 1464 was

enacted as part of the FCC Act, not part of the statutes considered
in the other cases.

The use of the disjunctive "obscene, indecent,

or profane" in § 1464 evidences a Congressional intent to reach
more than mere obscenity.

In addition, the SG asserts, § 1464,

unlike the other statutes, was meant to reach words themselves,
without regard to their context.

Finally, if the use of "indecent"

in § 1464, either as construed by the FCC or as it might be
construed, is neither unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, then
there is no reason to put a narrowing gloss on the term.
Although this issue is not without difficulty, my own view
is that Congress probably meant to reach all language that

constitut~ona:.!:._ co~d

be proscribed, whether or not it is "obscene."

\ Here, unlike 12 200-Foot Reels and Hamling, at least a colorable ; '
argument can be made that nonobscene matter constitutionally
can be banned, because it is the broadcast media that are involved.
In this situation, I would find it necessary to confront the
constitutional issues that are presented by the FCC's attempt to
define what nonobscene but "indecent" language may be proscribed,
rather than construing § 1464 so as to avoid the issue.

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 1464 AS CONSTRUED.
A. Pacifica.

Pacifica's strongest argument begins from

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where the Court reversed
the conviction for "disturbing the peace by offensive conduct"
of a young man who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
in the halls of a courthouse.

Although "women and children" had

viewed the jacket, 403 U.S., at 16, the Court rejected any argument
that the audience was "captive":
"[P]ersons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous
emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences.
Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting
their eyes." Id., at 21.
Offensiveness, without more, was not sufficient justification
to ban use of the offending word:
"How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive
word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable
to the most squemish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable
general principle exists for stopping short of that result
were we to affirm the judgment below • • • •
"Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it
is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only 'i deas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well." Id., at 25-26.
See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S., at 210-211:
"Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our
political and moral, sensitivities. Nevertheless, the
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.
Rather, absent the narrow circumstances described above,
the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes.' "(Quoting Cohen.)

From all this, Pacifica argues that the FCC cannot ban nonobscene
speech on the ground that it is offensive to some people.
In addition, Pacifica argues that the FCC's four justifications
for treating broadcast media differently will not withstand
scrutiny~

The FCC's reasons, and Pacifica's replies, are as

follows:
1. "Radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's
privacy is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office,
397 U.S. 728 (1970)."

The answer is that Rowan only allowed the

government to prevent material from reaching the home where
an unwilling recipient had asked it to.

The FCC ban is much

different because it prevents both willing and unwilling recipients
from receiving mat~erial. . In addition, the degree of intrusiveness
into the home is minimal, since a simple turn of the dial can tune
offensive material out.

This is not like a soundtruck case, where

one cannot escape even in the confines of one's own home.
2. "Unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any
warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast."
And they can tune it out again just as quickly.

A radio, like _ ,

.

"the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so obtrusive as to make
it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to
it.' "

Erznoznik, 422 U.S., at 212.

Or, as Lehman v. City

of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) put it, "The radio
can be turned off, but not the billboard or streetcar placard."
3. "There is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which
the government must therefore license in the public interest."

But this rationale can be used only to increase, not to limit,
the range of material that is available through the broadcast
media.

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)

(holding that the Fairness Doctrine does not violate the First
Amendment).
4. "Children have access to radios and in many cases are
unsupervised by parents."
as broad as the FCC's.

This argument cannot justify a rule

First, there was no evidence before the

FCC as to when children listen to the radio, when they are
not supervised by parents, or the like.

Thus, the FCC's "channeling"

approach rests on its guesses about these facts, and nothing more.
In addition, the "channeling" approach is not like that approved
~v.

in/American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), for here, unlike
there, it operates to prevent

~ many

to desired material altogether.

adults from obtaining access

Rules that are intended to protect

children cannot be applied to limit the fare that is available
to adults to what is considered suitable for children:
"The State insists that, by thus quarantining the
general reading public against books not too rugged for
grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, ~ ~
it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.
Surelft' this is to burn the house to roast the pig • • •
' • • • The incidence of this enactment is to reduce
the adult population • • • to reading only what is fit for
children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-384 (1957).
Even where material is judged in terms of its effects on
children, it must be judged as a whole, not by particular words
considered out of context:
"Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to
minors. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by

any other government interest pertaining to minors. Speech
that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate prosceiption cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from unsuitable ideas or imap,es that
a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. '
Erznoznik, 422 U.S., at 214.

And even though parents have in

interest in raising their children, nothing in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), authorizes the government to make
these choices on behalf of parents.

Even if it did, there has

been no showing that parents generally wish to keep from their
children "indecent" language, regardless of context.
Finally, Pacifica argues, even if the FCC's Order should be
judged as applied, rather than on its face, its application here
was not valid.

The FCC made no showing that children were likely

to be in the audience at 2 p.m. and, in fact, independent surveys
show that there are fewer children in the radio audience during
the 10:00 a.m. to 3:oo p.m. time slot than for any other execpt
the midnight-to- 6:00 a.m. period.
n.40.

Brief for

*~

Pacifica at 48

Moreover, the FCC expressly declined to consider whether the

Carlin routine had any redeeming value in the context in which it
was played.
B. The Soliciter General.

The SG, who is a statutory party

to this case, agrees with Pacifica that the FCC's Order, on its
face, violates the First Amendment.

His positiont is not, however,

that the FCC cannot ban indecent language at all.

His analysis

proceeds as follows:
1. First, the FCC's justifications all are insufficient to

justify a ban as broad as this one.

He rejects the the argument

that the FCC can limit what is broadcast because of the scarcity
of radio channels, contending that this rationale justifies only
requirements that stations broadcast diverse sorts of programming.
He also rejects the notion that radio's intrusiveness into the
home justifies the ban, because of the ease withWhich it may
be tuned out.

He admits that the desire to protect children

from indecent language is a legitimate one, but he argues that:
"The basic difficulty [with the FCC's approach] is that it
is impossible, as a practical matter, to segregate the
radio audience between adults and minors • • • [A]s things
are, the inevitable effect of a ban aimed at protecting
minors is to 'reduce the adult population,' at least during
most waking hours, to hearing on radion 'only what is fit
for children.' Butler v. Michigan. That cannot be squared
with the First Amendment." Brief for SG at 34-35.
2. Although the SG is not very explicit about what
alternative approach might be valid, he does make a couple of points
worth considering.

First, he suggests that indecent language that

is deliberately used to assault the listeners' sensitivities could
r:w:;?P

s'Ta

~

be banned whenever it is broadcast:
imposition of
"[§1464] authorizes the/sanctions upon the radio broadcast p:f
tlie words involved here when, in context, although they do not
appeal to the prurient interest, they are directed at any
person, or at the audience generally, in a deliberately
hostile manner, or when they are · uttered, not innocently
or merely for emphasis, but are spewed forth without any
arguable justification in a conscious attempt to shock,
offend, or outrage."
Brief for SG at 40-41.

Second, he suggests that children still

can be protected to some extent, without reducing adult fare to
a level fit only for children:

"[T]he Commission might properly prohibit the inclusion
of the offending words in any radio broadcast specifically
directed at younger children, regardless of when broadcast."
Id., at 41.
C. The FCC.

The FCC, while recognizing that Cohen v.
now
California is not without relevance to this case,/contends that
that two factors distinguish the broadcast media from other
media and justify its Order: "broadcasting has unique qualities,
and broadcast licensees bear special obligation." Brief for FCC
at 30.
Broadcasting, the FCC .
uniquely

pe rya~e,

of children.

argues, is uniquely intrusive and

and these differences justify greater protection

Whereas it takes affirmative action for a child to

go in search of dirty books or dirty movies, it does not take such
action to find dirty radio shows: "Broadcasts are much more
difficult for parents to supervise.

Broadcasts are easily

accessible to young persons even in the privacy of the horne,
without the need for comparable affirmative acts." Id.

Moreover,

the FCC asserts, broadcasting differs from other media in that
"it requires affirmative acts of avoidance to escape the stuff
once it has come on the air." Id., at 36.

_ ,.

Thus, the FCC must protect

those people - especially children - who cannot protect themselves.
As to the broadcasters' "special obligations," the FCC
argues that "broadcasters are public trustees subject to a higher
standard of conduct than the morals of the marketplace." Id., at 38.
This special trust derives from the fact that the government has
selected them to serve the community through the use of resources the airwaves

~

that belong to the community as a whole.

The FCC also urges that the Court review the order
narrowly because when it "confronts a different set of facts,
[it] can determine whether the principles announced in the
declaratory order should be applied,
Id., at 42-43.

modified or extended."

It blames Pacifica for the breadth of the order,

contending that Pacifica did not point out all the serious works
of literature that the ban covers when the case was before the
FCC.

Id., at 43.
D. Discussion. I begin by noting that you have taken the

position in the past that there is a category of language - neither
"obscene" nor "fighting words" - which so offends the sensitivities
that unwilling listeners may be protected from it by the government:
"[T]he exception to First Amendment protection recognized
in Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere utterance
entails a high probability of an outbreak of physical
violence. It also extends to the willful use of scurrilous
language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an
unwilling audience."

*

*

*

*

"[A] verbal assBU,l t on an unwilling audience may be
so grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be
the proper subject of criminal proscription, whether under
a statute denominating it disorderly conduct, or, more
accurately, a public nuisance."

~
-se-n-f-:w v.

New Jersey, 408 U.s. 901, 905-906 (1972) (Powell, J : , "

dissenting); see also Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2,
4 (1973)(Powell, J., dissenting);
422 UoS. 205, 210-211 n. 6 (1975).

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
Assuming that you still

are of this view, the fact that the FCC's Order reaches language
that is not constitutionally obscene would not, by itself, invalidate
the order.

/2~1- ~.

14.

~J/'.v'1_, ,._, ~

As far as adults are concerned, two features of the Order
are especially troublesome to me.

First, despite the FCC's

assertions to the contrary, the fact that unwilling adults
are free to tune out offensive programming - to avert their
ears, in effect - seems to me to cut strongly against the notion
that the FCC must be able to protect adults whose sensitivities
might be offended.

Adult radio listeners are not a captive audience

in any realistic sense of the word.

If the First Amendment requires

those who might be offended to avert their eyes from the
jacket in Cohen and the movie screen in Erznoznik, I think that
it requires no less of radio listeners.

Cf. Brown v. Oklahoma,

408 U.S. 914 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring), where you distinguished
Rosenfeld on the ground that in Brown, "language of the character
charged might well have been anticipated by the audience."
The second feature that especially troubles me is that the
almost
FCC Order makes/no attempt to accomodate the asserted interest
in protecting children with adults' interest in hearing programming
that is permissible for willing adults.

On one hand, I doubt

whether children need very much to be protected from the occasional
use, in otherwise valuable programming, of some of the words on
the FCC's forbidden list.

As has been pointed out, there is much

serious literature that contains some of this language.

On

the other hand, the FCC's Order prevents adults who do not stay
~E/

up to midnight from hearing such programming, despite whatever
their own preferences might be.

15.

The difficult feature of this case, to my mind, is that
likely is more difficult to supervise childrens' use of
radio than it is their use of books, films, and the like.

Thus,

it can be argued that the FCC should be able to protect children
from non-obscene, non-assaultive uses of "indecent" language
that their parents would protect them from if they could.

The

analogy, I suppose, would be to ordinances that bar the admission
of children to topless bars and the like.

-

But even in this

setting, I would argue, context must count for something, both
to protect the childrens' own First Amendment righ~ see Erznozkik,
422 U.S., at 212-213,
/and to provide a measure of protection to adults' rights. Thus,
even if the basic idea behind the FCC's channeling approach
is sound - I

~

disturbed by the lack of facts about when

children actually are in the audience - I think it falls short
in its complete failure to consider the context in which language
is used.
For this reason, I would hold the FCC order overbroad on
its face.

Although it is not

eas~

sketch out what a

constitutionally permissible scheme of regulation might be,
I think it might contain these features:
1. Despite the lack of a truly captive adult audience,
the FCC might be allowed to proscribe deliberately assaultive
language of the kind described by your Rosenfeld dissent. The
uses of
lack of value in such/language, together with the possibility
that children will hear it, would support this conclusion.

2.The FCC might be allowed to "channel" works that have a
good deal of offensive language, yet a good deal of value, into
time slots that it can demonstrate contain the fewest number
of unsupervised children.

This might not be just the late evening

hours; as Judge Leventhal hinted, it is entirely conceivable
that during the early evening hours, parents are capable of
enough
supervising their children to a sugficient/extent that the FCC's
help is not needed.

The FCC should be required at least to

explore this possibility, since adults' rights would be more
fully protected if programs were made available when they could
listen to them.

Into this category of works might fall such works

as the Nixon tapes and Carlin's routine.
3. Works that contain only occasional offensive language
might be allowed at any hour.

Thus, filmed news reports of public

demonstrations might not be required to be censored for the
benefit of anyone.

Likewise, the occasional conversational use

of offensive language in a radio discussion show might not bring
the FCC down on the station that broadcast it.

*

*

I have not worked this out as far as I would like.

But I

do feel strongly that the FCC has employed something of a meat-ax
approach where a scalpal would have done better.

I think there

is a need for more refined balancing of the interests involved
here than the FCC recognized, and I would send the case back to
it for a second attempt.
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76-528 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
Miscellaneous Preargument Notes
1.

Three statutory provisions are arguably

relevant:
(a)

Section 1464 of the Criminal Code ("obscene,

indecent or profane" language on radio is a criminal
offense).
(b)

Section 326 of the Communications Act

(forbids radio censorship) .
controlling.
(c)

Judge Tamm views this as

Bazelon relied solely on First Amendment.
Section 303(g) authorizes FCC to regulate "in

the public interest".

2.

FCC argues that § 326 cannot be viewed as

incompatible with § 1464, as the latter originally was a
part of §326 itself.
(a)

FCC emphasizes that "indecent" must be viewed

as having a different meaning from "obscene".

3.
(a)
controlling.
(b)

Divergent views of CADC judges.
Tamm viewed §326, prohibiting censorship, as
Also viewed FCC's order as overbroad.
Bazelon held that the order violated the

First Amendment, regardless of the statutes.

Relying

2.
on Miller's definition of obscenity, Bazelon thinks that
the term "indecent" can have no separate meaning.
(c)

4.
(a}

Leventhal dissented (see below} .

Much depends on how one reads FCC order.
Those who wish to invalidate it (respondent,

amici and the SG} insist the order must be reading
sweepingly.
(b)

Those who defend the order (other than FCC,

there are not many who do}, read it narrowly - as did
Leventhal.

5.

It is important to understand exactly what FCC

did.
(a}

Leventhal's view- strongly endorsed by FCC's

-

briefs - is that it is the "holding" that must be viewed as
"'

being all that is before us.

The remainder of its

"Memorandum Opinion and Order" (App. 63} is only
"informational".

Ask FCC Counsel.

(b)

As Leventhal notes, the FCC opinion is

divided into "discussion", "conclusion" (App. 72}, and
"order".

3.

(c)

The "order" merely states that the complaint

filed against Pacificia is granted to extent indicated
above.
(d)

In its conclusion, FCC characterizes the

narrative portion as "a declaratory order" rather than "a
notice of apparent liability".

A declaratory order is a

"flexible device" - largely informational.
one.

It binds no

Any one agrieved may request reconsideration.

Judicial review of commission action then is available.

6.
(a)

Judge Leventhal's dissent:
Holding of FCC is extremely limited:

It held

only:
"That the language as broadcast was indecent and
prohibited by §1464".
(b)

yalidity of the holding must be judged, and

read as applying only to the facts in this case.
(b)

The critical facts were (i) the offensive

words were "repeated over and over":* (ii) broadcasts in
the early afternoon when children were "in the audience":
and (iii) made clear that broadcasts in the evening would
not be so limited- i.e., would not force adults to listen
to broadcasts "fit only for children".

*Leventhal referred to this as "lavishly loving
reiteration".

4.

7.

Judge Leventhal's observations relative to his

rationale.
{a)

Different principles as to children.

Brennan's dissent in Miller v. California impliedly
recognized this.
{b)

Miller expanded the Roth definition of

obscenity to include "patently offensive representations of
excretory functions".
{c)

Distinguishes Erznoznik and Cohen as dealing

with a drive-in theater at night and a courthouse neither
places frequented by young children.
{d)

Emphasized widespread access of radio to

{e)

Material that may have some literary,

children.

educational or artistic value to an adult may not have such
value in a broadcast heard by children.

Their

understanding and perceptions are different.

L.F.P., Jr.
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I shall await the dissent.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

June 16, 1978

From: Jim Alt
Re: Justi£e Stevens' op1n1on for the Court in No. 77-528,
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.
Although there is much in this opinion with which you
can agree, you may - as discussed infra - have some trouble
joining all of Part IV.

I discuss each Part of the opinion

in order.
Part I (p. 7): This part holds that the FCC's order should
be viewed and reviewed narrowly, as applied to this case, and
not broadly, as if it were a general rule of prospective
application.

As I recall, this is the view you took of the

case, and it was Judge Leventhal's view.
Part II (pp. 8-11): This part holds that 47 U.S.C. § 326,
which prohibits the FCC from exercising powers of "censorship"
over licensees, does not bar the order in this case.

•.

As I read

the opinion, it holds that § 326 means no more than that the
FCC may not exercise prior restraints over broadcasts; the section ··
does not speak at all to whether the FCC may punish licensees
subsequently for their broadcasts.
I was a little surprised to find that the opinion does not
hold that the sweep of § 326 is the same as that of the First
Amend~ent,

which had been my initial view.

Since § 326 was

enacted at a time when the First Amendment was not thought to
bar much more than prior restraints, it is not surprising to find

·.

2.

that this was the early understanding of the section's meaning.
It could be argued, though, that the meaning of § 326 changed

J along

with that of the First Amendment.

In the final analysis,

-

however, it does not make much difference whether § 326 is
viewed as crystalizing the old view of what "censorship" is,
or as expanding with the First Amendment.

Even if § 326 is

viewed as static, the First Amendment itself always will be
available to challenge FCC actions that arguably infringe on
the broadcasters' rights, but do not constitute "prior restraintso"

f:

For this reason, . I would have no difficulty joining Part II.
Part III (pp. 12-15):

.•.

This part holds that 18 U.S.C. § 1464,

which prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane"
language, covers more ground than that encompassed in the Court's
constitutionally
concept of the/"obscene."
It also holds that Carlin's routine

••'.

used language that was "indecent" within the meaning of § 1464.
I agree with the first conclusion, and Pacifica does not dispute

------~~---------------------~
the
second.

---------------------------

Part IV (pp. 16-26): This part holds that the FCC's order
does not violate Pacifica's First Amendment rights.
with this section

My problem

is that Justice Stevens is making many of

the same points that he made in Part III of Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 (1976) -

which you pointedly

did not join, see 427 U.S., at 73 n.l (Powell, J., concurring) •
.1.. -1- .T v q /(-AL~-t> #LJ2u
In particular, he beats the d
16UCf and long for the pro ~ osition
that the government can

•k/

content~-

-::_/

--

speech on the basis of its

and he argues that the degree of regulation may vary
I am particularly distressed at his characterization
[note continued next page]

..

•I;J.·.,•

·.

3.

according to the value which the Court thinks inheres in the
particular speech at issue.

Thus, although the speech at issue

here is "not entirely outside the protection of the First
Amendment," it need not be given the same protection "as that

·;

accorded to expressions of political or religious opinion."
Opinion at 21. These are the same points he made in Part III

I

of Mini Theatres, to which you replied:
"I do not think we need reach, nor am I inclined to a gree
with, the holding in Part III (and supporting discussion)
that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently
under the First Amendment principles from other forms
of protected expression. I do not consider the conclusions
in Part I of the opinion to depend on distinctions between
protected speech." 427 U.S., at 73 n.l.
I think that Justice Stevens is trying, as he did in

Mini Theatres, to work out a "sliding scale" theory of Firs t
Amendment protection.

The more "valuable" the speech, the

more First Amendment protection it would be entitled to.

Thus,

"political" speech probably would get the most protection, and

•·

speech of the kind at issue here would get the least - although
even it still would get some protection.

This theory is in

conflict with the Court's traditional approach of deciding
simply whether speech

is "protected" or "unprotected," under

which the Court has characterized obscenity, fighting words,
of Mini Theatres as "refus[ing] to hold that a 'statutory
classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the
content of communication protected by the First Amendment.' "
Opinion at 19, quoting 427 u.s., at 52. The quote from Mini Theaters
is from the introductory paragraph of the Court's opinion, Which
purported to state the "primary question presented" and which I
do not understand you to have joined. See 427 U.S., at 73,
where you concurred "in Parts I and II," which began on page 58.

·.

4.
~nd

incitements as "unprotected."

But all speech that fell

into the "protected" category received the same amount of
protection, without regard to further distinctions based
on the content of the speech.
One argument in favor of Justice Stevens' approach is that
it simply carries one step further what the Court has been
doing all along.

Even to make the decision whether speech is

"protected" or "unprotected," the Court must look to the content
of the speech.

Another argument is that Justice Stevens'

approach affords at least some protection to speech at the lower
end of the scale - such as that here - that otherwise might
be held "unprotected" altogether.

The strongest argument

against the approach is that it requires the Court to decide
which speech is most "valuable", which is less "valuable", and
which is least "valuable."
~~ own ~arying

d

The danger is that the Justices'

.,~

....•

..

•·

values will feed into the decision too much, whereas

some kind of concensus may be reached where the decision is simply
whether speech is "protected" or not.
that ~ the

In addition, the decisions

Court will be called upon to make may become impossibly

complicated and refined.

There is a parallel to be drawn here

to . the debate over whether Equal Protection analysis should
be divided simply into "strict scrutiny" and "rational relation"
tests, or whether, as Justice Marshall has urged, a "sliding scale"
test should be used.
If you are not inclined to adopt the "sliding scale"
approach to the First Amendment - which, I gather from your

"'<

5.

Mini Theatres

A

to what to do here.
in its entirety.

S:iiJit

-

the problem remains as

I doubt whether you could join Part IV

At the same time, I doubt whether it would

be consistent with ptior law - particularly Cohen v. California
403 U.S. 15 (19

), to hold that the language used by Carlin

is unprotected altogether.

It seems to me possible to reach

the same result in this case by emphasizing the following points:

.'

\

(1) The FCC's holding does not bar adults from access to
Carlin's record.

They may buy it in stores and play it at home,

and they probably will be able to hear it over the radio late at

.

night.

'

Here, as in Mini Theatres, the FCC simply has "zoned"

·,.

speech so as to serve an important value.

Compare your Mini

Theatres concurrence at 427 U.S., at 76-79.
(2) The important value that is served - protecting children
but protected
from objectionable/speech - has been recognized in the past.
~'

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629.

--

Radio differs from

other media because it is uniquely accessible

~o

children.

(I

4-~

would emphasize this point considerably more than does Justice
Stevens, and de-emphasize the argument that this speech has
less "value" than other speech.)
(3) It also might be possible to argue that this speech
is akin to a "verbal assault" even to so:ne adults.
~'

Compare,

your dissent in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,

905-906 (1972).

It would be tricky to make this argument, since

its implication is that the speech is not protected at all.

The

argument would have to be that the bamadcaster cormnits an "assault"

6.

by broadcasting Carlin's record during afternoon hours when
both children and adults who may E not be aware of the coming
content are liable to be injured by the broadcast.

*

*

*

*

*

This case is difficult to solve without some reference
to the content of the recordx at issue.

At the same time,
"

I

do not think it is necessary to downplay the Court's tradition

that the degree of protection due speech should not depend on
the content of speech quite so much as Justice Stevens does.
Justice Sax Stevens needs your E vote to make a majority, so
it might be possible to get him to remove portions of his
opinion that take xk his Mini Theatres line. Alternatively, you
could decide that he is correct in taking that approach, and
join him altogether.

The third alternative is to x write for

.'

yourself with regard to Part IV, a task with which I would be
happy to help.
JA

~·

.
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J\.me 16, 1978

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica

..

Dear John:
I await the dissent.

Sincerely,

T.M.

•··

Mr. Justice Stevens

cc:

'!he Conference

.

•'

j

I
1

l•
I

·.

.§.u:pumt <!Jo.u:rl af tlt.t ~.tb .§taUs

~Ctilfrittghm.lB. <!f. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 16, 1978

Re:

No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
r ...
j'

/~~

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.·•''
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•

.,' .

.§n.puntt C4cu:rtllf ±4t~b .§taftg
~ltil!p:nghtn. ~.

'4·

20.;t>!~

•,

•.

'

..
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

June 16, 1978

77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
.··•·•.

Dear John:
........

I join.

··'--:,

I suggest for your consideration a cite to
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (CADC),
which I believe Skelly Wright relied on in AntiDefamation League (your opinion p. 10).

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

..."
'

'

'·

No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: 1st draft
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join parts I, II, and III of MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' opinion without reservation.

~

eeat~

part l~ ~ar

.......-errTp'hasis Lls..-..t. lhe Court today reviews only the
Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent
"as broadcast" at two o'clock in the afternoon, and not
the broad sweep of the Commission's opinion.
16-18.

Ante, at 7,

In addition to being consistent with our settled

practice of not deciding constitutional issues
unnecessarily, see ante, at 7; Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297

u.s. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis,

J., concurring), this narrow focus also is conducive to
the

thought£~~

!PM orderly development of this relatively

new and difficult area of law, in the first instance by
the Commission, and then by the reviewing courts.
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,

See

U • S • App. D• C •

, 556 F.2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, J.,
dissenting) •

Since I expect the Commission to proceed in

a cautious and reasonable manner in the future, as it has
in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, I do not
foresee an undue "chilling" effect on broadcasters'

I also agree with much that is said in Part IV of

2.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the

tt:t.

...r

Because I ~t subscribe to all that

First Amendment.

is said in Part IV, however, I state my views
t~8~e

~~

ehi8

separately.
I

It is conceded that the monologue at issue
is not obscene,.

a~

~

-i:aai!M: in the constitutional sense.

56 F.C.C.2d 94,

(1975); Brief for Petitioner 18.

See
Nor,

in this context, does its language constitute "fighting
words" within the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568

(1942).

Some of the words used have been

held protected by the First Amendment in other cases and
~'

contexts.

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130

(1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414
University of Missouri, 410

u.s.
u.s.

105 (1973); Papish v.
667

(1973); Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of
Tulsa, 415

u.s.

697 (1974).

) consistently with the First Amendment, be ,!ll!ellented

~roHtp--

~ punished for delivering the same monologue to a live

audience composed of adults who, knowing what to expect,
chose to attend his performance.
408

u.s.

See Brown v. Oklahoma,

914 (1972) (POWELL, J., concurring in result).

3.

And I would assume that an adult could not
constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a recording
or transcript of the monologue and playing or reading it
in the privacy of his own home.
394

u.s.

557

Cf. Stanley v. Georgia,

(1969).

Di!liiipite

8l.J.-~i&•

it also is true that the

1\

~~ ...~~·A_.
language employed is, to most people,~~~ me3t
offensive

•

ehe

~A

tilA9W&.

It was chosen

for this quality, and it was repeated over

&p~eifica~~

and over

EpgJ~sh

~

~a

sort of linguistic shock treatment.

t\

.-

J4~~

--

o4think Jhe Commissioierr• in characterizing the

Ptdtfbetl

category of language used here as "patently offensive" to
most

people~ +4f~~~ iJ-f ~ • 11- ~ ._::1-

..ll..,~r

~ ~~k, .
e issue

'iA

ehii!l

i'?Se

is whether the Commission

may impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the
afternoon.

The Commission's primary concern was to

prevent the

~-~4 ..
I'IQA~&9'1e from reaching the ears of

..._.r

~

unsupervised children who were likely to be in the
audience at that hour.

In essence, the Commission sought

to "zone" the monologue to hours when the fewest

"

4.

unsupervised children would be exposed to it.
F. C. C. 2d, at

See 56

In my view, this consideration

__} ~,/
........-::-

provides strong support for the Commission's holding.

12 3 ~

The Court P•8of:IioguliiiLY has recognized society's
right to "adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to
adults."

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,

212 (1975); see

also,~'

Miller v. California, 413

u.s.

15, 36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
( 1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) .

u.s.

184, 195

This recognition stems in

large part from the fact that "a child . • . is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees."

Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651

(1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in result) .

Thus, children

may not be able to protect themselves from speech which,
although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided
by the unwilling through the exercise of judicious
choice.

At the same time, such speech may have a deeper

and more lasting negative effect on a child than an
adult.

For these reasons, society may prevent the general

dissemination of such speech to children, leaving to

5.

parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their
children shall hear and repeat:
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v.
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The
legislature could properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility ...
11

Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639; see also Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 709-710
(1977) (POWELL, J. ,~oncurring in p~ t) • ~

I~n-~m~y~v~t~e~~- ~e

Commission properly held that the

speech from which society may attempt to shield its
children is not limited to that which appeals to the
youthful prurient interest.
case

The language involved in this

~ ..~ ~ ca,..c..;

~e~

ial'\ii8 -pt n p er -a.Jw-b3'X'5

-e~

f:Hl!"Crrl!al

potentially degrading and harmful to

~pe~v4eiOI~

&~8

. d ren ~ s
c h 11

~ representat1onA ~5eecri~~180

ac

.

S'

8

.

.

fAero t'1c
o~

First Amendment bars government from
prohibiting willing adults from communicating with each
other in such terms, it does not prevent the government
from giving parents an opportunity to teach their childr n
to do

6.

In most instances, the dissemination of this kind
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting
willing adults' access to it.

Sellers of printed and

recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live
performances may be required to shut their doors to
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults'
access.

See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635.

The

difficulty is that such a physical separation of the
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.

both adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in
the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach
willing adults without also reaching children.

This,

a..d.L£~~

then, is c;;ule 8:! l!h@' ditf'E!"I>eiiC@15 between the broadcast and

1\
other media to which the Court often has adverted as
justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media
for First Amendment purposes.

See Bates v. State Bar of

Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)

~

Columbia Broadcasting

System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 101

(1973)~

367, 386-387

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.

(1969)~

Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,

333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000

7.

(1972); see generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952).

In my view, the Commission was

entitled to give substantial weight to this difference in
reaching its decision in this case.

where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.

Erznoznik

v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen
v. California, 403
Office Dept., 397

u.s.
u.s.

15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post
728 (1970).

Although the First

.
'

"

Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first
blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in
public before they turn away, see,

t

C

~,

Erznoznik, supra,

v

at 210-211 J a different order of values obtains in the
home.

"That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary

ol7Jee+i~~le
of the home and subject toJebjeetiobdjLspeech and other
sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere."
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, at 738.

::Ji!or

!Rl'

ui.OI'I$,

he

Commission also was entitled to give this factor ~
•

~···'!~~
-\ weight in

the circumstances of the instant case. This is

~"··~eaernl
..~k<.k.Jl

not to say, however, that the Commission has 'Eil
h

?u~..,., J'k.\

~ e••r~-.,.

~·.;r._, ~ ~

~ ~.-.-4{ . ~~ ~~

U..J

~~.,;u41;;, ~ ~ ..u -,·~~ ,A.Jbd4 ~
license to decide what speech, protected in other media, ~

protec~

may be banned from the airwaves in order to

~.,

unwilling adults from momentary exposure to it in

the ~~

~~~

It is argued that despite society's right

~

protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the
early afternoon hours.

It is said that this ruling will

have the effect of "reduc [ ing] the adult population .
to [hearing] only what is fit for children."
Michigan, 352

c~~Q~m~

u.s.

380, 383 (1957).

This argument is not

The Commission certainly should consider

..,....,.

it as it develops standards in this area.
OQR 11 iQ~

'ih~

Commission

A.

~

eaeiFe~

this case.

But f am Rot

it is sufficiently strong to leave the

.4-·~-~~.,
"eef

Butler v.

powerless to act in efte circumstances

-

~

The Commission's holding does not prevent willing
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript

; '

9.

reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion.

On its

face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the

4t....

monologue during evening hours when fewer children are

"

likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any
time during the day.

I'A my

vi-.w.,~e

Commission's

holding, and certainly the Court's holding today, does not

'jl-~ •...,4,.~ ·-~~ ....~

speak to cases involving the isolated use of

a ~i~w~

leees•

word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished
from the linguistic shock treatment administered by
respondent here.

In short, I agree that on the facts of

this case, the Commission's order did not violate
respondent's First Amendment rights.
II
As the foregoing demonstrates, I agree with much
that is said in part IV of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion.
See ante, at 22-26.
because I

li!le:H:~

MA

I do not join that part, however,
J./) ~t
aaaele' ot!-e subscribe to the theory that

the Justices of this

hA- Hw- ~,.,_,
~ which

.\

Court (2enerall~

are

free ~o

decide

l1'f ;:::t:;.; ~~

speech protected by the First Amendment is most

"valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and
which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less
protection.

Compare ante, at

18-22~

Young v. American

10.

Mini Theatres, 427

u.s.

50, 63-73 (1976) (opinion of

STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l (POWELL, J.,
concurring).~/

In my view, the result in this case does

not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a whole,
or the words that comprise it, have more or less "value"
than a candidate's campaign speech.

This is a judgment

for each person to make, not one for the judges to impose
upon him.
The result turns instead on the
of the broadcast media, combined
'QgQ9Ci~

...

~.~~ ~

unique ~q~ali~s

~rimar~~

with society's

right to protect its children from speech
•

be4~~eir years, and
wit~willing aduy...,se;:~teres~n

generally agreed to
secondarily

'

not being assaulted by such offensive speech in their
homes.

~~

~

iddiei~,

I doubt whether today's decision will

prevent any adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message
in Carlin's own words from doing so, and

from~~or

A-~:·(,.. ~:~· ·~ ~ 1-o N-4 ,.,... ••.::4

himsel ~ -aae-i.b

J;'

of the message and words.

Cf.

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79
(POWELL, J., concurring).

These

a~ewe

are the grounds

upon which I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV.

...

,._

FOOTNOTES
*The Court has, however, created a limited
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment.
v. Ohio State Bar Association,

u.s.

See Ohralik
(1978) •
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No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join parts I, II, and III of MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' opinion without reservation.

The Court today

reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in the
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's
opinion.

Ante, at 7, 16-18.

In addition to being

consistent with our settled practice of not deciding
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 7;
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus
also is conducive to the orderly development of this
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing
courts.

See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, ___ U.S. App.

D.C.
J., dissenting).

556 F.2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal,

2.

I also agree with much that is said in part IV of
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the
First Amendment.

Because I do not subscribe to all that is

said in part IV, however, I state my views separately.
I

It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is
not obscene in the constitutional sense.

See 56 F.C.C.2d

94,

Nor, in this

(1975); Brief for Petitioner 18.

context, does its language constitute "fighting words"
within the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) .

Some of the words used have been held

protected by the First Amendment in other cases and
contexts.

~'

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974);

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University
of Missouri, 410

u.s.

667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403

U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415
697 (1974).

I do not think Carlin,

u.s.

consistently with the

First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who,
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance.
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408
concurring in result).

u.s.

914 (1972) (POWELL, J.,

And I would assume that an adult

could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or

3.

reading it in the privacy of his own home.

Cf. Stanley v.

Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
But it also is true that the language employed is,
to most people, vulgar and offensive.

It was chosen

specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment.

The

Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to
most people regardless of age.

It was at least wholly

without taste.
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the
afternoon.

The Commission's primary concern was to prevent

the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised
children who were likely to be in the audience at that
hour.

In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the

monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children
would be exposed to it.

In my

See 56 F.C.C.2d, at

view, this consideration provides strong support for the
Commission's holding.!/
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt
more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youths than on those available to adults."
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422

u.s.

205, 212

4.

(1975); see

also,~'

Miller v. California, 413

u.s.

15,

36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

u.s.

184, 195

This recognition stems in

large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J.,
concurring in result).

Thus, children may not be able to

protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
through the exercise of judicious choice.

At the same

time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting
negative effect on a child than an adult.

For these

reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and
repeat:
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v.
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The
legislature could properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility."

5•

Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639; see also Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 709-710
(1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in part).

The Commission

properly held that the speech from which society may
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which
appeals to the youthful prurient interest.

The language

involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as

~representations

of many erotic

acts.
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting
willing adults' access to it.

Sellers of printed and

recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live
performances may be required to shut their doors to
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults'
access.

See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635.

The

difficulty is that such a physical separation of the
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
without also reaching children.

This, then, is one of the

distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which
the Court often has adverted as justifying a different
treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment

6.

purposes.

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,

384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969);
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see generally
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503
(1952).

In my view, the Commission was entitled to give

substantial weight to this difference in reaching its
decision in this case.
A second difference, not without relevance, is
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.
City of Jacksonville, 422

u.s.

Erznoznik v.

205, 209 (1975); Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

Although the First Amendment

may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of
offensive but protected speech when they are in public
before they turn away, see,

~,

Erznoznik, supra, at

210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408

u.s.

901,

903-909 (1972) (Powell, Jr., dissenting), a different order
of values obtains in the home.

"That we are often

7.

'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere."
supra, at 738.

Rowan v. Post Office Dept.,

The Commission also was entitled to give

this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the
instant case. This is not to say, however, that the
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from
momentary exposure to it in their homes.~/

Making the

sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy.
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.
It is argued that despite society's right to
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early
afternoon hours.

It is said that this ruling will have the

effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to
[hearing] only what is fit for children."
Michigan, 352
without force.

u.s.

380, 383 (1957).

Butler v.

This argument is not

The Commission certainly should consider it

as it develops standards in this area.

But it is not

8.

sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to
act in circumstances such as those in this case.
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion.

On its

face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time
during the day.

The Commission's holding, and certainly

the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent
here.

In short, I agree that on the facts of this case,

the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First
Amendment rights.
II
As the foregoing demonstrates, I agree with much
that is said in part IV of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion.
See ante, at 22-26.

I do not join that part, however,

because I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment

9.

is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most
protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence
deserving of less protection.

Compare ante, at 18-22;

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427

u.s.

50, 63-73

(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l
(POWELL, J., concurring) .l/

In my view, the result in

this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue,
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech.

This

is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the
judges to impose upon him.
The result turns instead on the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society's right to protect its children from speech
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and
secondarily with the interest of unwilling adults in not
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes.
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any
: "

adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words.
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79
(POWELL, J., concurring).

These are the grounds upon which

I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV.

FOOTNOTES

1.

See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful

opinion in the Court of Appeals.
, 556 F.2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal,
2.

___ u.s.

App., at

J~dissenting).

It is true that the radio listener quickly may

tune out speech that is offensive to him.

In addition,

broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their
content.

But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting

listener who tunes in at the middle of a program.

In this

respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry
r
~
w~ings on their mariuees.
3. The Court has, however, created a limited
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment.
v. Ohio State Bar Association,

u.s.

See Ohralik
(1978).
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL,
I join parts I, II,
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III

JUSTICE
The Court today

reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in the
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's
opinion.

Ante, at 7

~8

In addition to being

consistent with our settled practice of not deciding
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 7;
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus
also is conducive to the orderly development of this
relatively new and difficult area of .law, in the fir s t
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing
courts.

See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, ___ U.S. App.

D.C.
J., dissenting) .

556 F. 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventh a l,

2.

I also agree with much that is said in part IV of
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the
First Amendment.

Because I do not subscribe to all that is

said in part IV, however, I state my views separately.
I

It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is
not obscene in the constitutional sense.

See 56 F.C.C.2d

94,

Nor, in this

(1975); Brief for Petitioner 18.

context, does its language constitute "fighting words"
wi~hin

the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.

568 (1942).

Some of the words used have been held

protected by the First Amendment in other cases and
contexts.

~,Lewis

v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974);

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University
of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403

u.s.

15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S.

697 (1974).

I do not think Carlin,

consistently with the

First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who,
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance.
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J.,
concurring in result).

And I would assume that an adult

could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or

3.

reading it in the privacy of his own home.
Georgia, 394

Cf. Stanley v.

u.s. 557 (1969).

But it also is true that the language employed is,
to most people, vulgar and offensive.

It was chosen

specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment.

The

Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to
most people regardless of age.

It was at least wholly

without taste.
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the
afternoon.

The Commission's primary concern was to prevent

the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised
children who were likely to be in the audience at that
hour.

In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the

monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children
would be exposed to it.

See 56 F.C.C.2d, at

In my

view, this consideration provides strong support for the
Commission's holding.l/
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt
more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youths than on those available to adults."
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212

• '

4.
(1975); see also,
36 n. 17
636-643

~'

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,

(1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
(1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378

(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

u.s.

184, 195

This recognition stems in

large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J.,
concurring in result).

Thus, children may not be able to

protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to
most adults, generally may 0e avoided by the unwilling
through the exercise of

ki,u~Jchoice.

At the same

time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting
negative effect on a child than an adult.

For these

reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and
repeat:
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture o( the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v.
Massachusetts, [321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)]. The
legislature could properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility."

5•

Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639{
:2.opu~I

710- - - y
The Commission

properly held that the speech from which society may
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which
appeals to the youthful prurient interest.

The language

involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as

~representations

of many erotic

acts.
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting
willing adults' access to it.

Sellers of printed and

recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live
performances may be required to shut their doors to
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults'
access.

See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635.

The

difficulty is that such a physical separation of the
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
C1A_..~~~
without also reaching children. This, ~ ~ 1s one of the ~
distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which
e

~

~t

~

often ..fTa-8 adverted as justifying a different

.1\
1\
treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment

6.
purposes.

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,

384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969);
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405

u.s.

1000 (1972); see generally

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503
(1952).

In my view, the Commission was entitled to give

substantial weight to this difference in reaching its
devision in this case.
A second difference, not without relevance, is
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.
City of Jacksonville, 422

u.s.

205, 209

Erznoznik v.

(1975); Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

Although the First Amendment

may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of
offensive but protected speech when they are in public
before they turn away, see,

~'

Erznoznik, supra, at

210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,
903-909 (1972) (Powell, Jr., dissenting), a different order
of values obtains in the home.

"That we are often

- '

7.
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere."
supra, at 738.

Rowan v. Post Office Dept.,

The Commission also was entitled to give

this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the
instant case. This is not to say,

ho~ever,

that the

Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from
momentary exposure to it in their homes.~/

Making the

sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy.
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.
It is argued that despite society's right to
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early
afternoon hours.

It is said that this ruling will have the

effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to
[hearing] only what is fit for children."
Michigan, 352
without force.

u.s.

380, 383 (1957).

Butler v.

This argument is not

The Commission certainly should consider it

as it develops standards in this area.

But it is not

8.

sufficiently strong to leave
act in circumstances such as those in this case.
The Commission's holding does not prevent
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion.

On its

face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time
during the day.

The Commisoion's holding, and certainly

the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent
here.

In short, I agree that on the facts of this case,

the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First
Amendment rights.

J: ike~t. o~t.--:r;..., tltJ- pot- ·fkJ .f "is of•.M.io~
As the

-

forego~demonstrates,

l- ~ t:ee-

w±-nrill1Jc l1

is said in part rVJ of MR. JUSTICE. STE~l~ ) pinion.

See ante, at 22-26.

I do not join

par ,

owever,

because I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment

9.

is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most
protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence
deserving of less protection.

Compare ante, at 18-22;

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-73
(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l
(POWELL, J., concurring) .l/

In my view, the result in

this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue,
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech.

This

is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the

~

judges to impose upon him.

The result turns instead on the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society's right to protect its children from speech
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and

~i~y

with the interest of unwilling adults in not

being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes.
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words.
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79
(POWELL, J., concurring).

These are the grounds upon which

I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV.

FOOTNOTES

1.

See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful

opinion in the Court of Appeals.
, 556 F.2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal,
2.

u . S • App. , at
J~ dissenting).

It is true that the radio listener quickly may

tune out speech that is offensive to him.

In addition,

broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their
content.

But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting

listener who tunes in at the middle of a program.

In this

respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry

r
~
w~ings on their mar*uees.
3. The Court has, however, created a limited
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment.
v. Ohio State Bar Association,

u.s.

See Ohralik
(1978).

~

4. For )fhe same reason, I also do not join part IV(a).
As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, ante, at 6, the Commission's
order was limited to the facts of this case; "it did not
purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the promulgation
of any regulations."

In addition, since I

tellf'~t

Commissio~p~~~le

the
RI&Rfter ift the

~ ' as it has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43,
I do not foresee an undue "chilling" effect on broadcasters'

{g;~;::;~:-~

exercise of their rights.

t/L_) ~ .- - - - - - _ , .
respondent's overbreadth challengeAmuet
f&i •

~

Fer the reasons s tateej tn the tilxfii, supra, smJe'J"C:r::t_ ~ Qe..

~t.;:f

not~~

the
that/application

vel ~ of overbreadth analysis

should depend on the Court's judgment as to the value of the
protected speech that might be deterred.
14-15.

See ante, at

Except in the context of commercial speech,

&e~

see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-381 (1977),
it has not in the past.
415

u.s.

130 (1974);

See,~,

Lewis v. New Orleans,

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).

~u:pumt <!fcu:rt of tlrt ~b $5htlt.tt
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RE: No. 77-528 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation
Dear John:
I'll probably join Potter but I'll also be writing
something on the constitutional question.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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June 20, 1978
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No. 77-528
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I

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.

,,:

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference
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~arry:
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· I am gJad to jo:in you in my concurring opi.nion,

and to make the tchanges you suggest.
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In view of the situation in the print shop, I
w 11 not. reci tculate for this purpose. . The changes will
be made in the first printed 0raft.
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Dear Harry:

~·.

am glad to join you in my concurring opinion,
and to make the changes you suggest.
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In view of the situation in the print shop, I
wi.ll not recirculate for this purpose. The changes will
be made in the first printed draft.
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 20, 1978

Re: No. 77-528

-

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

Dear Lewis:
I appreciate your letting me climb aboard in this case.
I am in no position to bargain, but the two minor suggestions I
have are:

1. That on page 4 of the typed draft, 12th line, the
word judicious 11 be eliminated. I suspect adults have a choice
whether it is or is not judicious.
11

2. That the citation to Carey appearing on the first
three lines of page 5 be omitted. You do have the solid quotation from Ginsberg there. And, as you know, I was on the other
side in Carey.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

QI01tri ~f Urt ~tth ~httts
~-lfittghnt. ~. QI. 2llP:'!.;J

,ju:puntt
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

PERSONAL
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S. S'c Ptw.

~ '/~.t.o
June 20, 1978

Re:

77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

Dear Lewis:
Because you indicated that you might be able
to join portions of Part IV, I have broken it into
three subsections.
I think everything with which
you took issue is in subpart B (which includes
pages 18 thru 22 of the typed draft).
To a certain extent the review of overbreadth
analysis in subpart A rests on the premise that
this speech is not very important and therefore
your problems with subpart B may carry over to subpart A as well. Nevertheless, I would hope that you
would at least think about joining subpart A because
it is an important part of the picture.
~ believe,
also, that it is consistent with the analysis in
Harry's opinion in Bates.
Some of my changes are the product of further
thinking prompted by your concurrence, but I do not
mean to take issue with anything you have said and
will welcome any suggestions you care to make notwithstanding our rather narrow area of disagreement.
Thank goodness we are at last on the horne
stretch.
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Respectfully,
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
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v. Pacifica Foundation

POWE~~ concurring.

MR. JUSTICE

I join parts I, "'J[)
STEVENS'

opinion.w+z~~~

~
III)
-···;~--

o."'d IV(c:.)

of MR. JUS'riCE

!e&er~i~~

The Court today

reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in th e
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's
opinion.

Ante, atli!

~ 1~

In addition to being

consistent with our settled practice of not deciding
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante,

atll~

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus
also is conducive to the orderly development of this
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing
courts.

See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,

D.C.
J., dissenting).

, 556 F. 2d 9, 35-37

U.S. App.
(1977) (Leventhal,

2.

I also agree with much that is said in part IV of
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the
First Amendment.

Because I do not subscribe to all that is

said in part IV, however, I state my views separately.
I

It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is
not obscene in the constitutional sense.

See 56 F.C.C.2d

94,

Nor, in this

(1975); Brief for Petitioner 18.

context, does its language c:onstitute "fighting words"

Chaplins~v.

within the meaning of
568

(1942).

New Hampshire, 315 U.S.

Some of the words used have been held

protected by the First Amendment in other cases and
contexts.

~~'

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974);

Hess v. Indiana, 414
of Missouri, 410

u.s.

105 (1973); Papish v. University

667

(1973); Cohen v. California, 403

u.s.

U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S.
697

(1974).

I do not think Carlin,

consistently with the

First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who,
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance.
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914
concurring in result).

(1972) (POWELL, J.,

And I would assume that an adult

could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or

: "

3.
reading it in the privacy of his own home.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557

Cf. Stanley v.

(1969).

But it also is true that the language employed is,
to most people, vulgar and offensive.

It was chosen

specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment.

The

Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to
most people regardless of age.

It was at least wholly

without taste.
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the
afternoon.

The Commission's primary concern was to prevent

the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised
children who were likely to be in the audience at that
hour.

In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the

monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children
would be exposed to it.

See 56 F.C.C.2d, at

,

In my

view, this consideration provides strong support for the
Commission's holding.l/
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt
more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youths than on those available to
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422

u.s.

adults~"

205, 212

~

4.
(1975); see
36 n. 17
636-643

also,~,

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,

(1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
(1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378

(1964)(opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

u.s.

184, 195

This recognition stems in

large part from the fact that "a child .

.

. is not

possessed of that full capacity for individual choice whic h
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J.,
concurring in result).

Thus, children may not be able to

protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
through the exercise of

~tldieie~choice.

At the same

time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting
negative effect on a child than an adult.

For these

reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and
repeat:
"fC)onstitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our
society.
'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.'
Prince v.
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The
legislature could properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility."

5•

Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639o eee al--so
}2.gfH 1 at iOfl-~v i.c..es-I-FH=e-t:= nat i o~l U.S.

H:977) (PGWELL, J.,

cm~--4:-ftg

in

C~

678 ,

part~_The

v ..,__

7~

Commission
"'

properly held that the speech from which society may

·~

I

·-

attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which
appeals to the youthful prurient interest.

The language
I, •

involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as

~representations

of many erotic

acts.
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting
willing adults' access to it.

Sellers of printed and

)

.

recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live
performances may be requiied to shut their doors to
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults'
access.

See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635.

The

difficulty is that such a physical separation of the
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and
'

'•

unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
A.<; i-ke,_ Coa.rt €"""- ~ec..si :z.~

without also reaching children.

Th1s,

is one of the

distinctions -between the broadcast and other media to which

.ehe

S&~~ten l>ltfa~';?erted

as justifying a different

treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment

'-

purposes.

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 35 C

384 (1977); Columbia Bro a dca s ting Sy s tem, Inc. v.
Democr at ic Nation a l Committee, 412

u.s.

94, 101 (1973); ge e

Lion Bro a dcasting Co. v. FCC, 39j U.S. 367, 386-387 (1 969);
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC

1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see g e nerally
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343

(1952) .

u.s.

495, 502-503

In my view, the Commission was entitled to give

substantial weight to . this difference in reaching its
decision in this case.
A second difference, not without relevance, is
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209

Erznoznik v.

(1975); Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

Although the First Amendment

may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of
offensive but protected speech when they are in public
before they turn away, see,

~,

Erznoznik, supra, at

210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,
903-909

(1972}

(~,

J~,

dissenting), a different order

of values obtains in the home.

"That we are often

7.
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere."
supra, at 738.

Rowan v. Post Of fice Dept.,

The Commission also was e 'n titled to give

this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the
instant case. This is not to say, however, that the
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from
n1omentary exposure to it in their homes .l/

Making the

sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy.
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in t he
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.
It is argued that despite society's right to
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early
afternoon hours.

It is said that this ruling will have the

effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to
[hearing] only what is fit for children."
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
without force.

Butler v.

This argument is not

The Commission certainly should consider it

as it develops standards in this area.

But it is not

8.
sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to
act in circumstances such as those in this case.
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion.

On its

face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any
during the day.

ti~e

The Commission's holding, and certainly

the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguish e d from
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent
here.

In short, I agree that on the facts of this case,

the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First
Amendm e nt rights.

~V\ y ~ :ewS
w;-t-~

aYe

~e.Kera..lly ;"'-

a.C.C.or-J ;

wkt
II

~h6lcis s::dt:: ::::g~i;~~d::~n;::::::·STE~~}Jopinion.
See

ante, Qt!JS iil&, I do not join ~ pa
l<t- :ll·

because I

wever,

o not subscribe to the theory that the Justices

of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment

---------------------------------------------------]: tke.v--e.for-e_.

jo;"

t-ko..t porftok. of hi'S Of;~-t/o~.

9.

is most "valuable" and

h~nce

deserving of the most

protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence
deserving of less protection.

Compare ante,

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427

u.s. ·so,

a~
63-73

(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l
(POWELL, J., concurring)

.l/

In my view, the result in

this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue,
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech.

This

is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the

9:.1

judges to impose upon him.

The result turns instead on the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society's right to protect its children from speech
generally agreed to be inappropri.ate for their years, and
.eeeeooafo~

with the interest of umvilling adults in not

being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes.
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words.
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79
(POWELL, J., concurring).

These are the grounds upon which

I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV.

FOOTNOTES

1.
o~~nion

·.

See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful
U . S . App . , at

in the Court of Appeals.

, 556 F.26, at 32-35
2.

(Leventhal,

J~

dissenting).

It is true that the radio listener quickly may

tune out speech that is offensive to him.

In addition,

broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their
content.

But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting

listener who tunes in at the middle of a program.

In this

respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry

r

cy

wtings on their mar*uees ..
3. The Court has, however, created a limited
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment.
v. Ohio State Bar Association,

u.s.

See Ohralik
(1978).

.
J
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Pacifica: new note 4.

4. For much the same reason, I also do not join
part IV(a).

As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, ante, at

6, the Commission's order was limited to the facts of this
case~

"it did not purport to engage in formal rulemaki ng

or in the promulgation of any regulations."

In addition,

since the Commission may be expected to proceed

t
I.

cautiously, as it has in the past, cf. Brief for
Petitioner 42-43, I do not foresee an undue "chilling"
effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights.

I

agree, therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge
is meritless.
I had not thought that the application vel non of
overbreadth analysis should depend on the Court's judgment
as to the value of the protected spe ech that might be
deterred. See ante, at 14-15.

Except · in the context of

commercial speech, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433

u.s.
~,

350, 380-381 (1977), it has not in the past.
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S . 130 (1974)

v. Wilson, 405

u.s.

518 (1972).

~

See,
Gooding

·,
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
/ ,

I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that, under Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and United States v.
12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (i.973), the word

~

"indecent" in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 must be construed to
prohibit only obscene speech.

I would, therefore,

normally refrain from expressing my views on any
constitutional issues implicated in this case.

However, I

find the Court's misapplication of fundamental First
Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose

)

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 2

its

-

~y

myopic notions of

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

propri~~on

the whole of the

American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain
silent.
I

For the second time in two years, see Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court
refuses to embrace the notion, completely antithetical to
basic First Amendment values, that the degree of
protection the First Amendment affords protected speech
varies with the social value ascribed to that speech by
five members of this Court.

See Opinion of MR. JUSTICE
I,

POWELL, ante, at

Moreover, as do all parties, all

members of the Court agree that the Carlin monologue aired
by Station WBAI does not fall within one of the categories
of speech, such as "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315

u.s.

United States,. 354

568 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v.

u.s.

476 (1957), that is totally

without First Amendment protection.

This conclusion, of

course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding that
communications containing some of the words found
sanctionable here are fully protected by the First
Amendment in other contexts.
415 U.S. 697

See Eaton v. City of Tulsa,

(1974); Papish v. University of Missouri

.
,.;

./'

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 3

Curators, 410 U.S. 667

Dis se nt (BRENNAN, J.)

(1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.

914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972);
Rosenfield v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

Yet despite the Court's

refusal to create a sliding scale of First Amendment
protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the
worth of a communication's content, and despite our
unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue is protected
speech, a majority of the Court!/ nevertheless finds
that, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not
constitutionally barred from imposing sanctions on
I,

Pacifica for its airing of the Carlin monologue.

This

majority apparently believes that the FCC's disapproval of
Pacifica's afternoon broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words"
recording is a permissible time, place, and manner
regulation.

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

Both

the opinion of my Brother STEVENS and the opinion of my
Brother POWELL rely principally on two factors in reaching
this conclusion:

(1) the capacity of a radio broadcast to

1/ Where I critically refer undifferentiatingly to
the ictions of "the Court," my reference is to this
majority, which consists of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS
and those members of the Court joining their separate
opinions.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundatio n:
Page 4

Di ssen t

(BRENNAN, J.)

intrude into the unwilling listener's home, and (2) the
presence of children in the listening audience .
Dispassionate analysis , r emoved from individual notions as
to what is proper and what is not, starkly reveals that
~""-""'--""'

these justifications, whether individ ua lly or together,
simply do not suppor t even the professedly moderate degree
of governm enta l homogenization of radio
communications--if, indeed, such homogenization can ever
be moderate given the pr eem inent status of the right of
free speech in our constitutional scheme--that the Court
today permits.
I,

A

Without question, the privacy interests of an
individual in his home are substantial and deserving of
significant protection.

In finding these interests

sufficient to justify the content regulation of protected
speech, however, the Court commits two errors.

First, it

misconceives the nature of the privacy interests involved
where an individual voluntaril y chooses to admit radio
communications into his home .

Second, it ignores the

constitutionally protected interests of both those who
wish to transmit and those who desire to receive
broadcasts that many--including the FCC and this
Court--might find offensiv e.

.
_,

./'

FCC v. Pacific a Foundation :
Page 5

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

"The abi lity of government , consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect
others from hearing it is

. dependent upon a showing

that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner .

Any broader view of this

authority would effectively empower a majority to silence
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. "
Cohen v. California, supra , at 21.

I am in wholehearted

agreement with my brethren that an individual's right "to
be let alone " when engaged in private activity within the
confines of his own home is encompassed within the
"substantial privacy interests" to which Mr. Justice

'·

Harlan referre d in Cohen, and is entitled to the greatest
solicitude.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

However, I believe that an individual's actions in
switching on and listening to communications tran sm itted
over the public airways and directed to the public
at-large does not implicate fundamental privacy interests,
even when engaged in within the home.

Instead, because

the radi o is undeniably a public medium, these actions are
more prope rly viewed as a decision to take part, if only
as a listener, in an ongoing public discourse.
Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment:

See Note,

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 6

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 579, 618
(1975).

Although an individual's decision to allow public

radio communications into his horne undoubtedly does not
abrogate all of his privacy interests, the residual
privacy interests he retains vis-a-vis the communication
he voluntarily admits into his horne are sure ly no greater
than those of the people present in the corridor of the
Los Angeles courthouse in Cohen who bore witness to the
words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned across Cohen's jacket.
Their privacy interests were held insufficient to justify
punishing Cohen for his offensive communication.
'·

Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his horne
to radio communications retains privacy interests of
sufficient moment to justify a ban on protected speech if
those interests are "invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner," Cohen v. California, supra, at 21, the very fact
that those interests are threatened only by a radio
broadcast of itself precludes the latter condition from
being satisfied; for unlike other intrusive modes of
communication, such as sound trucks, "[t]he radio can be
turned off," Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 302 (1974)--and with a rninirnun of effort .

As Judge

Bazelon aptly observed below, "having elected to receive

J

f

••

~

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 7

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an
offensive program is in the same position as the
unsuspecting passers-by in Cohen and Erznoznik [v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)]; he can avert his
attention by changing channels or turning off the set."
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (CADC 1977).
Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who
inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive
during the brief interval before he can simply extend his
arm and switch stations or flick the "off" botton, it is
surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's
I.

right to send, and the right of those interested to
receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment
protection.

To reach a contrary balance, as does the

Court, is clearly, to follow MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' reliance
on animal metaphors, ante at 21, "to burn the house to
I

roast the pig."

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383

(1957).
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord
proper weight to the interests of listeners who wish to
hear broadcasts the FCC deems offensive.

It permits

majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected
message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 8

minority.
result.

Dissent (BRENNA N, J.)

No decision of this Court supports such a
Where the individuals comprising the offended

majority may freely choose to reject the

materia~

being

offered, we have never found their privacy interests of
such moment to warrant the suppression of speech on
privacy grounds.
Heights, supra.
728

Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker
Rowan v. Post Office Departme nt, 397 U.S.

(1970), relied on by the FCC and by the opinions of my

Brothers POWELL and STEVENS, confirms rather than belies
this conclusion.

u.s.c.

§

In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute, 39

4009, permitting householders to require that
I .

mail advertisers stop sending them lewd or offensive
materials and remove their names from mailing lists.
Unlike the situation here, householders who wished to
receive the sender's communications were not prevented
from doing so.

Equally important, the determination of

offensiveness vel non under the statute involved in Rowan
was completely within the hands of the individual
householder; no governmental evaluation of the worth of
the mail's content stood between the mailer and the
householder.

In contrast, the visage of the censor is all

too discernable here.

FCC v. Pacifica Found a ti o n:
Page 9

Di sse nt (BRENNAN, J.)

B
Most parents will undoubtedly find understandable as
well as commendable the

Court's ~ sympathy

with the FCC 's

desire to prevent offensive broadcasts from reaching the
ears of unsupervised children.

Unfortunately, the facial

appeal of this justification for radio censorship masks
its constitutional insufficiency.

Although the government

unquestionably has a special interest in the well-being of
children and consequently "can adopt more stringent
controls on communicative materials available to youths
than on those available to adults,"

Erznoznik v. City of
I ,

Jacksonville, supra, at 212, see Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-107 (1973)

(BRENNAN, J.,

dissenting) , the Court has accounted for this societal
interest by adopting a "variable obscenity" standard that
permits the purient appeal of material available to
children to be assessed in terms of
of minors.

~he

sexual interests

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629

(1968).

It

is true that the obscenity standard the Ginsberg Court
adapted for such materials was based on the
then-applicable obscenity standard of Roth v. United
States, supra, and Memoirs v. Massachussetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966), and that "[w)e have not had occasion to decide

FCC v. Pa cific a Found a tion:
Page 10

Di sse nt (BRENNA N, J.)

u.s.

what effect Miller [v. California, 413
will have on the Ginsberg formulation."
of Jacksonville·, supra, at 213 n .10.

15 (1973)]

Erznoznik v. City

Nevertheless, we

have made it abundantly clear that "under any test of
obscenity as to minors . • . to be obscene 'such
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.'
Cohen v. California, 403

u.s.

15, 20 (1971) ."

Ibid.

Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not an
erotic appeal to the prurient interests of children, the
Court, for the fir s t time, allows the government to
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are
I,

not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them.~/
It thus ignores our rec ent admonition that "[s]peech that
is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative

2/ Even if the monologue appealed to the purient
interest of minors, it would not be obscene as to them
unless, as to them, "the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15, 24 (1973).

FCC v. Pa cifica Foundation:
Page 11

Dissent (BRENNAN , J.)

body thinks unsuitable for them."

rd., at 213-214.2/

The Court's refusal to follow its own pronouncements is
especially lamentable since it has the anomalous
subsidiary effect, at least in the radio context at i ss ue
here, of making completely unavailable to adults material
which may not constitutionally be kept even from
children.

This result violates the principle of Butler v.

Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) in spades.

Butler involved

a challenge to a Michigan statute that forbade the
publication , sale, or distribution of printed material
"tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or
'·

immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the
morals of youth."

Id., at 381.

Although Roth v. United

States, supra, had not yet been decided, it is at least
arguable that the material the stautue in Butler was
designed to suppress constitutionally could have been

3/ It may well be that a narrowly drawn regulation
prohibiting the use of offensive language on broadcasts
directed specifically at younger children constitutes one
of the "other legitimate proscription[s]" alluded to in
Erznoz nik. This is so both because of the difficulties
inheren t in adapting the Miller formulation to
commu nications received by young children, and because
such children are "not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of the First
Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 , 649-650 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring).

.
J

••

~
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Nevertheless, this Court found the

statute unconstitutional.

Speaking for the Court, Mr.

Justice Frankfurter reasoned;
"The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the
adul t population of Michigan to reading only what is
fit for children.
It thereby arbitrarily curtails one
of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that history has attested as the indispensable
conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free
society." Butler v. Michigan, supra, at 383-384.
Where, as here, the government may not prevent the
exposure of minors to the suppressed material, the
principle of Butler applies

~

fortiorari.

The opinion of

my Brother POWELL acknowledges that there lurks in the '·
today's decision a potential for "'reduc[ing] the adult
population • . . to [hearing] only what is fit for
children,'" ante at

, but expresses faith that the FCC

will vigilently prevent this potential from ever becoming
a reality.

I am far less certain than my Brother POWELL

that such faith in the Commission is warranted, see
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397, 418-421 (Statement of Bazelon, C.J., as to why
he voted to grant rehearing en bane); and even if I shared
it, I could not so easily shirk the responsibility assumed
by each member of this Court with the donning of his robes

;

./

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 13

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

jealo usl y to guard against encroachments on First
Amendme nt freedoms.
In concluding that the p resence of children in the
listening audience provides an adequate basis for the FCC
to sanction Pacifica's broadcast of the Carlin monologue
over radio, th e opinions of my Brother POWELL, ante at
and my Brother STEVENS, ante at 20, both stress the
time-honored right of a parent to raise his child as he
sees fit--a right this Court has consistently been
vigilent to protect.

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
(1925).

u.s.

u.s.

205

510

Yet this principle supports a result directly

contrary to that reached by the Court.

Yoder and Pierce

hold that parents, net the government, have the right to
make certain
chil d!e n.

decis io~s

regarding the upbringing of their

As sur pris:n g as it may be to individual

mem bers of this Court , some parents may actually find Mr.
Carli n's unabashed attitude towards the seven "dirty
words " healthy, and deem it desirable to expose their
childr e n to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the
taboo surrounding the words.

Such parents may constitute

a minority of the Am e rican public, but the absence of
great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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chil dren in thi s fashion does not alter the right's nature
or it s existence .

Only the Court's regrettable decision

does that.i/

c
As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied
on by both the Opinion of my Brother POWELL and the
Opinion of my Broth e r Stevens--the intrusive nature of
radio and the presence of children in the listening
audience--can, when taken on its own terms, support the
FCC's disapproval of the Carlin monologue.

These two

asserted justifications are further plague d by a common
II

failing:

the lack of principled limits on their use as a

basis for FCC censorship.
mind, and neither o f
serve to clarify
the ?ri vacy and

tt~

~h e

No such limits come readily to
opinions comprising the Court

ex tent to which the FCC may assert

c h i:~re n-in-the-audience

rationales as

just i::s ation fo r ex?un ging from the airways protected

4/ The opinion s of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS
rightl y refrain from r e lying on the notion of "spectrum
scarcity " to suppor t their result. As Chief Judge Bazelon
noted below, "although scarcity has justified increasing
the diversity of spe akers and speech, it has never been
held to justify c e n s orship." 556 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in
original). See Re d Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367' 396 (1969) . - - -

I

I
I

I
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communic ations the Commission finds offensive.

Taken to

their l ogical extreme , these rationales would support the
cleansing of public radio of any "four-letter" words
whatsoever, regardless of their context.

The rationales

could justify the banning from radio of a myriad of
literary works, novels, poems , and plays by the likes of
Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway , Ben Jonson, Henry Fielding,
Robert Burns, and Chaucer: they could support the
suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as
the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for
sanctioning the broadca s t of certain portions of the Bible.
In order to dispel the spectre of the possibility of
so unpalatable a degree of censorship, and to defuse
Pacifica ' s

overbre ad~h

desires only the

challenge, the FCC insists that it

a ut~or ity

to reprimand a broadcaster on

fac ts a nalogous t o those present in this case, which it
de s c r:.:Je s as invo lving "broadcasting for nearly twelve
minu tes a record which repeated over and over words which
depict sexual or excretory activities and organs in a
manner patently of fe nsive by its community ' s contemporary
standards in the early afternoon when children were in the
audience."

Brief for the Federal Communications

Commission 45.

The opinions of both my Brother POWELL and

FCC v. Pacifica Foundution:
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my Br oth er STEVENS take the FCC at it s word, and
cons eque ntly do no more than p ermi t the Commission to
censor the afternoon broadcast of th e "so rt of lingui stic
shock treatment," Opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ante
at

, involved here.

To insure that the FCC's

regulation of protected speech does not exceed th ese
bounds, my Brother POWELL is content to rely upon the
judgment of the Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems
it prudent to rely on this Court's ability accurately to
assess the worth of various kinds of speech.~/

For my

own part, even accepting that this case is limited to its

~/
Although ultimately depend e nt upon the outcome of
review in this Court , the approach taken by my Brother
STEVENS would not a p~?a r to tolerate the FCC's suppression
of any speech, such as political speech, falling within
the core area of Fi :st Amendment concern.
The same,
however , cannot b e s2id of the approach taken by my
Bro ther POWE LL, which, on its face, permits the Commission
to sa ~c ~ion ev en political speech if it is sufficiently
off e~e-to communi~! standards.
A result more contrary
to ru c~me ntary Fir st Am endment principles is difficult to
~
imag ine .

--------

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: . Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)
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fact s,~/ I would place the responsibility and the right

to weed worthless and offensive communications from the
public airways wher e it belongs and where, until today, it
resided; in a public free to choose those communications
worthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by
the censor's hand.
II

The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my
Brothers POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's
censorship of the Carlin monologue on the basis of two
demonstrably inadequate grounds is a function of their
perception that the decision will result in little, if
any, curtailment of communicative exchanges protected by

~/
Having in sis=ed that it seeks to sanction radio
commun ications o nly 1~ the limited circumstances present
her e, I believe that the FCC is estopped from using either
this d~cisi on or its own orders in this case, 56 F.C.C.2d
94 (1575 ), and 59 F.e.C .2d 892 (1976), as a basis for
sanc tioni ng any public radio broadcast other than one
air ed dur ing th e daytime or early evening and containing
the relentless repetition, for longer than a brief
inter val , of "langu age that describes, in terms patently
offen sive as measu red by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
and organs." 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 . For surely broadcasters
are not now on notice that the Commission desires to
regulate any offensive broadcast, other than the type of
"linguistic shock treatment" condemned here, at any time,
or even this shock treatment type of offensive broadcast
during the late evening.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
Page 18

the Fi rs t Amendm e nt.

Dissent (BRENNAN, J.)

Although the extent to which the

Court stands ready to countenance FCC censorship of
protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find
the reasoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC
censorship they approve will not significantly infringe on
First Amendment values both disingenuous as to reality and
wrong as a matter of law.
My Brother STEVENS, in reaching a result
apologetically described as narrow, ante, at 21, takes

---

comfort in his observation that "[a] requirement that

-

indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect

on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication," ante at 14 n.l8, and finds solace in his
conviction that "[t )':er e are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expresse c
lang uag e."
and
be

i~s

Icl.

the use of less offensive

T:::e id ea that the content of a message

potenti a l

di ~or ced

~y

i~?act

on any who might receive it can

from t he wor ds that are the vehicle for its

expr essi on is tra nspa rently fallacious.

--------

A giv e n word may

have a unique capac ity to capsule an idea, evoke an
emotion, or conjure up an image.

Indeed, for those of us

who place an appropriately high value on our cherish e d
First Amendment rights, the word "censo r " is such a word.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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Mr. Just ic e Harlan, speaking for the Court , recognized the
truism that a speake r ' s choice of words cannot surgically
be separated from the ideas he desires to express when he
warned that ''we cannot indulge the facile assumption that
one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.''
Cohen v. California, supra, at 26.

Moreover, even if an

alternative phrasing may communicate a speaker ' s abstract
ideas as effectively as those words he is forbidden to
use, it is doubtful that the sterilized message will
convey the emotion that is an essential part of so many
communications.

This, too, was apparent to Mr. Justice

Harlan and the Court in Cohen.
''[W]e cannot ov e=l ook the fact, because it is well
illustrated by ~~e episode involved here, that much
linguistic ex pres3i on serves a dual communicative
function:
it ccnve ys not only ideas capable of
r ela tively pr ecise , detached explication, but
o t~er wise ine xp~es sible emotions as well.
In fact,
word s are oft en c ho sen as much for their emotive as
t ~eir cogniti ve f o r ce.
We cannot sanction the view
t hat the Con bs t itu tion, while solicitous of the
c ogn itive cont e n t of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically
spea king, may ofte n be the more important element of
th e overall mes s age sought to be communicated."
Id.
at 25-26.
My Brother STEVENS also finds relevant to his First
Amendment analysis the fact that " [ a]dults who feel the

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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purchase tapes and records or go to theatres and

nightclubs to hear [ the tabooed] words."
n.27.

My Brother POWELL agrees:

Ante, at 21

"The Commission's

holding does not prevent willing adults from purchasing
Carlin's record, from attending his performances, or,
indeed, from reading the transcript reprinted as an
appendix to the Court's opinion."

Ante at

The

opinion s of my Brethren display both a sad insensitivity
to the fact that that these alternatives involve the
expenditure of money, time, and effort that many of those
wishing the hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to
afford, and a naive innocence of the reality that in many
'-

c ases, the medium may well be the message.
The Court

appar e~ :ly

believes that the FCC's actions

here can be analog :zed to the zoning ordinances upheld in
Young v . American
it is

~ rong.

~i~i

Fir s~,

Theatres , supra.

~h e

const itut ional mu ster in

For two reasons,

zoning ordinances found to pass
~oung

had valid goals other than

the ch a nneling of protected speech.

Id. at 71 n.34

(Opinion of STEVFNS, J .); id. at 80 (POWELL, J.,
concurring).

No such goals are present here.

Second, and

crucial to the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS
in Young--opinions which, as they do in this case, supply

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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the b are five-person majority of the Court--the ordinances
did not restrict the access of distributors or exhibitors
to the market or impair the viewing public's access to the
regulated material.

Id. at 62, 71 n.35

STEVENS, J.); id. at 77

(Opinion of

(POWELL, J., concurring).

this is not the situation here.

Again,

Both those desiring to

receive Carlin's message over the radio and those wishing
to send it to them are prevented from doing so by the
Commission's actions.

Although, as my Brethren point out,

Carlin's message may be disseminated or received by other
means, this is of little consolation to those broadcasters
and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least among
them financial, do not have access to, or cannot take
advantage of, these ot her means.
Moreover, it i s dou btful that even those frustrated
liste ~e rs
grat u~o us

in a pos itio n to follow my Brother POWELL"S
advice a nd attend one of Carlin's performances

or pur ch ase one of his records would receive precisely the
same me ssage Pacifica's radio station sent its audience.
The airways are capable not only of carrying a message,
but also of transforming it.

A satirist's monologue may

be most potent when delivered to a live audience; yet the
choice whether this will in fact be the manner in which
the message is delivered and received is one the First
Amendment prohibits the governm e nt from making.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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III
It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to
unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an
effort to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong
result the Court reaches in this case dangerous as well as
lamentable.

Yet there runs throughout the opinions of my

Brothers POWELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally
disturbing: a depressing inability to appreciate that in
our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think,
act, and talk differently from the members of this Court,
and who do not share their ) fragile sensibilities J

It is

only an acute ethnoce ntric myopia that enables the Court
to approve the cens o!s hip of communications solely because
of the words they

co~~ ain.

''A word is n ot s cr ystal, transpa r ent and unchanged,
it i s th e skin o f

2

_iv ing thought and may vary greatly in

colo r 2n d content accor ding to the circumstances and the
time in which it i s u se d."

425 (19 18)

(Holm e s, J.).

Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,
The words that the Court and the

Commission find so unpalatable may be the stuff of
everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the
innumerable subcultures that comprise this Nation.
Academic research indicates that this is indeed the case.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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See Jackson, Get Your Ass in the Water and Swim Like Me
(1974); Dillard, Black English

(1972); Labov, Language in

the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular
(1972).

As one resea r ch e r concluded, "[w]ords generally

considered obscene like 'bullshit' and 'fuck' are
considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black]
vernacular except in particular contextual situations and
when used with certain intonations."

Bins, "Toward an

Ethnography of Contemporary African Ameri ca n Oral Poetry,"
Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5 (Georgetown
University Press 1972).
Today's decision will thus have its greatest impact on
listening audiences compr ised of persons who do not share
the Court's view as

c~

which words or expressions are

accepta ble and who, fa: a variety of reasons, including a
consc :~us

expr es5

desire

t~

thems~lves

flout majoritarian conventions,
using words that may be regarded as

offe ns:ve by thos e from different socio-economic
backgrounds, and on broadca sters desiring to reach such
audiences.2/

In this context, the Court's decision may

7/ Under the approach taken by my Brother POWELL, the
avaiiability of b r oadcasts about groups whose members
comprise such· aud ie nces might also be affected~
Both news
broadcasts about activities involving these groups and
public affairs broadcasts about their concerns are apt to
contain interviews, statements , or remarks by group
leaders and members which may contain offensive language
to an extent my Brother POWELL finds unacceptable.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation:
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be s een for what, in the broader perspective, it really
is:

anoth er of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts

to force those groups who do not sh are its mores to
confo rm to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking.

See

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-511 (1977)
(BRENNAN, J., concur ring ).
Pacifica, in response to an FCC inquiry about its
broadcast of Carlin's satire on "the words you couldn't
say on the public airwaves," explained that "Carlin is not
mouthing obsceinties, he is merely using words to satirize
as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards
those words."

56 F.C.C.2d at

In confirming Carlin's

prescience as a soci al commentator by the result it
reaches today, the Ccur t evinces an attitude towards the.
"se ven dirty wor ds"

::~at

many others besides Mr. Carlin

and Pacif ica mig ht ces cribe as "silly".

Whether today's

deci sicn will simi larly prove "ha rmless" remains to be
seen.

One can on ly hope that it will.

To: Mr. Justice Powell

June 25, 1978

From: Jim Alt
Re: Justice Brennan's dissent in No. 77-528, FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation.

J;;-~
A.-b{_~
~~~

This dissent is intemperate in some places, smugly
self-righteous in others, and ludicrously overwritten in yet

others. (,[&, the reference at page 22 to "the Court's attempt
of
to unstitch the warp and woof ,fFirst Amendment law in an effort
to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong result the
Court reaches • •

.")

Analytically, however, it makes no

points that I had not anticipated, and none that I deem
worthy of reply.
There are a few small changes I
your opinion before it goes to

~

~~yld

propose making in

press~First,

I would

change the phrase "linguistic shock treatment" at pages 3 and
8 to "verbal shock treatment."

It is a bit less graceless, and

may convey the thought more accurately.

~,1
~ "It
~

Second, I would delete the sentence at page 3 that states:
[Carlin's monologue] was at least wholly without taste."

In part II you eschew making a value judgment on Carlin's monologue,

~ ~~s
~

f- -1IJ"IIV

sentence seems in tension with that position.

In addition,

e portion of the paragraph preceding this sentence is put in
terms of what "most people" would think, while this sentence seems
to express your own personal view.

Basically, I think the opinion

is stronger without the sentence than with it.

~ .IZ.o

1~

Third, also at page 3, I would change the word "zone" to

:n C.l....qP4 --~eJ ~ ~
(A>'' 1 cr...v , . . ;.,,J ·94..
aA.€

I

2.

"channel," to conform with the language used by the FCC and
in Justice Stevens' opinion.
Fourth_, . I would change the sentence at page 5 that reads,
"The language involved in this case could be as potentially
degrading and harmful to children" to say that the language
"is as potentially degrading and harmful."

Otherwise, the sentence

contains a double qualification.
Finally, I would rearrange the paragraphs that comprise
the text of note 4 as indicated in the attached copy, which seems
to me more logical.

*

*

After re-reading the three opinions in this case that
deal with the constitutional issue, I would immodestly venture
the thought that yours makes the most sense by an
margin.

lfp/ss

6/26/78

-·

Pr.3~~ 8~f
-rext of

Vt-.

fiLE COpy
3d draft
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No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
joins, concurring.
I join parts I, II, III and IV(c) of MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' opinion.

The Court today reviews only the

Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent
"as broadcast" at two o'clock in the afternoon, and not the
broad sweep of the Commission's opinion.

Ante, at 6.

In

addition to being consistent with our settled practice of
not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante,
at 6; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297

u.s.

288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow
focus also is conducive to the orderly development of this
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing
courts.

See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,

D.C.
J., dissenting).

U.S. App.

556 F. 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal,

.-

"

2.

I also agree with much that is said in part IV of
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its condlusion that
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the
First Amendment.

Because I do not subscribe to all that is

said in part IV, however, I state my views separately.
I

It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is
not obscene in the constitutional sense . . See 56 F.C.C.2d
94,

(1975): Brief for Petitioner 18.

Nor, in this

context, does its language constitute "fighting words"
within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
568 (1942).

u.s.

Some of the words used have been held

protected by the First Amendment in other cases and
contexts.

~,

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415

u.s.

130 (1974):

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University
of Missouri, 410

u.s.

u·.s.

667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403

15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S.

697 (1974).

I do not think Carlin,

consistently with the

First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same ; "
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who,
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance.
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J.,
concurring in result).

And I would assume that an adult

could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or

3.

reading it in the privacy of his own home.

Cf. Stanley v.

Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
But it also is true that the language employed is,
to most people, vulgar and offensive.

It was chosen

specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and

I over

as a sort of verbal shock treatment.

The Commission

did not err in characterizing the narrow category of
language used here as "patently offensive" to most people

I

regardless of age.
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the
afternoon.

The Commissibn's primary concern was to prevent

the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised
children who were likely to be in the audience at that

I hour.

In essence, the ComiT)ission sought to "channel" the

monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children
would be exposed to it.

See 56 F.C.C.2d, at

view, this consideration provides strong support for

In my
th~

'

Commission's holding.ll
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt
more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youths than on those available to adults."
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212

4.

(1975); see

also,~,

Miller v. California, 413

u.s. 15,

36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

This recognition stems in

large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J.,
concurring in result).

Thus, children may not be able to

protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
through the exercise of choice.

At the same time, such

speech may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect
on a child than an adult.

For these reasons, society may

prevent the general dissemination of such speech to
children, leaving to parents the decision as to what speech
of this kind their

ch~ldren

shall hear and repeat: ·

"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority ; ,
in their own household to direct the rearing of
their chil.dren is basic in the structure of our
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v.
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The
legislature coul.d properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of l.aws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility."

5•
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.

The Commission

properly held that the speech from which society may
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which
appeals to the youthful prurient interest.

The language

, . invoJ.ved in this case is as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as representations o: many erotic
acts.
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting
willing adults' access to it.

Sellers of printed and

recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live
performances may be required to shut their doors to
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults'
access.

See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635.

The

difficulty is that such a physical separation of the
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media.
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
without also reaching children.

This, as the Court

emphasizes, is one of the distinctions between the
broadcast and other media to which we often have adverted
as justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media
for First Amendment

6.
purposes.

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,

384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969);
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see generally
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wjlson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503
(1952).

In my view, the Commission was entitled to give

substantial weight to this difference in reaching its
decision in this case.
A second difference, not without relevance, is
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.
City of Jacksonville, 422

u.s.

205, 209

Erznoznik v.

(1975); Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728

(1970).

Although the First Amendment

may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of
offensive but protected speech when they are in public
before they turn away, see,

~,

Erznoznik, supra, at

210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
903-909

u.s.

901,

(1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), a di.fferent order

of values obtains in the home.

"That we are often

7.

'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere."
supra, at 738.

Rowan v. Post Office Dept.,

The Commission also was entitled to give

this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the
instant case. This is not to say, •however, that the
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from
momentary exposure to it in their homes.l/

Making the

sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy.
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect.
It is argued that despite society's right to
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from
;

"

listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early
afternoon hours.

It is said that this ruling will have the

effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to
[hearing] only what is fit for children."
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
without force.

Butler v.

This argument is not

The Commission certainly should consider it

as it develops standards in this area.

But it is not

8.

sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless .to
act in circumstances such as those in this case.
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript
reprinted as an appendix to the Court'e opinion.

On its

face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time
during the day.

The Commission's holding, and certainly

the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases
invol.ving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from
fthe verbal shock treatment administered by respondent
here.

In short, I agree that on the facts of this case,

the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First
Amendment rights.
II
As the foregoing demonstrates, my views are
generally in accord with what is said in part IV(c) of MR.
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion.

See ante, at 19-21.

join that portion of his opinion.

I therefore

I do not join part

IV(b), however, because I do not subscribe to the theory
that the Justices of this Court are free generally to

9•

decide on the basis of its content which speech protected
by the First Amendment is most "valuable" and hence
deserving of the most protection, and which is J.ess
"valuable" and hence deserving of less protection.

Compare

ante, at 15-18; Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S.
50, 63-73 (197G) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73
n.l (POWELL, J., concurring)

.ll

In my view, the result

in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue,
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech.

This

is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the
4/
. d ges to 1mpose
.
JU
upon h'1m.~

The result turns instead on the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society's right to protect its children from speech
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and
with the interest of unwilling adults in not being
assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes.
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words.
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
(POWELL, J., concurring).

u.s.,

at 77-79

These are the grounds upon which

I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV.

FOOTNOTES

1.

See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful

opinion in the Court of Appeals.

___ U.S. App., at

, 556 F. 2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
,

2.

It is true that the radio listener quickly may

tune out speech that is offensive to him.

In addition,

broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their
content.

But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting

listener who tunes in at the middle of a program.

In this

respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry
warnings on their marquees.
3. The Court has, however, created a limited
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment.
v. Ohio State Bar Association,

po..re\.~ra,~S

reo~rr.e.\

See Ohralik

u.s.

(1978).

4. For much the same reason, I also do not join
part IV(a).

I had not thought that the application vel non

of overbreadth analysis should depend on the Court's
judgment as to the value of protected speech that might be
deterred.

See ante, at 14-15.

Except in the context of

commercial speech, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433

u.s.

350, 380-38)

(1977), it has not in the past.

See,

FN-2
~,

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v.

Wilson, 405

u.s.

518 (1972).

As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, however, ante,
at 6, the Commission's order was limited to the facts of
this case; "it did not purport to engage in formal
rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations."

In

addition, since the Commission may be expected to proceed
cautiously, as it has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner
42-43, I do not foresee an undue "chilling" effect on
broadcasters' exercise of their rights.

I agree,

therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge is
meritless.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-528
Federal Communications Com-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the
mission, Petitioner,
United States Court of Ap·
v.
peals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Pacifica Foundation.
[June - , 1978]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN
joins, concurring.
I join Parts I, II, III, and IV(C) of MR. JusTICE STEVENS'
opinion. The Court today reviews only the Commission's
holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent "as broa:dcast0
at two o'clock in the afternoon , and not the broad sweep of
the Commission's opinion. Ante, at 6. In addition to being
consistent with our settled practice of not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 6; Ash wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) , this narrow focus also is conducive to the
orderly development of this relatively new and difficult area
of law, in the first instance by the Commission, 11nq then by
the reviewing courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, U. S. App. D. C . -, - - - , 556 F . 2d 9, 35-37 (1977)
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) .
I also a.gree with much that is said in Pa.r t IV of MR. JusTICE
STEVENS' opinion , 1111d with its conclusion that the Commissi011 's holding in this case does not violate the First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is said in Part·
IV, however, I state my views separately.
I
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is not
obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F . C. C. 2d 94,

.

. ·' '

,,
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~

.(1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this context, does
its language constitute "fighting words" within the meaning of
'Chapli:nsky v. Ne'IJ) Hampshire, ·315 U. S. 568 (1942). Some
of the words used have been held protected by the First
. Amendment in other cases and contexts. E. g., Lewis v. New
Orleans, 415 U. S. .130 (1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105
(1973); Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U. S. 667
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971); see also
Eaton v. City of .Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974). I do not think
Carlin, consistently with the First Amendment, could be
punished for delivering the same monologue to a live audience
composed of adults who. knowing what to expect, chose to
attend his performance. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U. S.
914 ( 1972) (PowELL, J., concurring in result). And I would
assume that an adult could not constitutionally be prohibited
from purchasing .a. recording or transcript of the monologue
and playing or reading it in the privacy ofhis own home. Cf.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
.
But it also is true that the language employed is, to most
people. vulgar and offensive. ·- rt was chosen specifically f<>r
this quality, and it was repeated over and over as a sort of
verbal shock treatment. · The Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow category of language used here as
11
patently offensive" to most people regardless of age.
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may impose
civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for broadcasting the
monologue at two o'clock in the after. The Commission's
primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching
the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the
audience at that hour. In essence, the Commission sought to
11
channel" ' the monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children would be exposed to it. See 56 F. C. C. 2d,
at - . In my view, this consideration provides strong support for the Commission's holding.1
l

..·.' ,.,,

.,.

}'

.•, '
).

'·

·'.

See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughiful opinion in the Court of

.

,

.,•

·'"
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The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt more
stringent controls on commuuicative materials available to
youths than on those available to adults." Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 212 (1975); see also, e. g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,636-643 (1968); Jacobellisv. Ohio,
378 U. S. 184, 195 (Hl63) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This
recognition stems in large part from the fact that "a child ...
is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STE.WART,
J., concurring in result). ·Thus, children may not be able to
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech
may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child
than an adult. For these reasons, society m~y prevent tl!e
general dissemination of such speech to children, lea.ving to
parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their
·ehildren shall hear and repeat :
"[C] onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct. the rearing of their children is basic
in the structure of our society. 'It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care, and nurture of th~ child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.' · Prince v. Massachusetts, [321 U. S.
158, 166 ( 1944)]. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who
have this primary responsibility for children's well~being ·
are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid disAppeals. dissenting) .

U. S. App., at -

--

..·,

•

<

, 556 F . 2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J., ·
\
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charge of that responsib'ility/'
S'Upra, at 639.

Ginsberg v. New Y ark~

The Commission properly held that the speech from which
society may attempt to shield its children is not limited to
that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest. · The
language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and
harmful to childrE-n as representations of many erotic acts.
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind of speech
to children 'may be limited without also· limiting willing
adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and recorded matter
and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may
be required to shut their doors to children. but such a requirement has no effect on adults' access. See Ginsberg v. New
York, mpra, at 634-635. The difficulty is that such a physical
separation of the audience cannot be accomplished in the
broadcast media. During most of the broadcast hours, both
adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
without also reaching children. This. as the Court emphasizes, is one of the distinctions between the broadcast and
other media to which we often have adverted as justifying
a different treatment of the broadcast media for First Amend-·
ment purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S.
350, 384 ( 1977) ; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 101 (1973);
Red Linn Broadcastiny Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-387
( 1969); Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (DC 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v.
Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 ( 1972); see generally
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952).
In my view. the Commission was entitled to give substantial
weight to this differE-nce in reaching its decision in this case.
A second difference. not without relevance, is that broadcasting-unlike most. other forms of communication-comes
directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily

77-528-CONCUR
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have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive
sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U. S. :205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21
(1971); Rowen v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970).
Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults
to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when
they are in publicc before they turn away, see, e. g., Erznoznik,
s'ttpra, at 210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S.
901, 903-909 ( 1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), a different order
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 'captives'
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objection~
able speech and other sou11d does not mean we must be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, at 738.
The Commission also was entitled to give this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the instant case. This
is not to say. however, that the Commission has an unre~
stricted license t.o decide what speech, protected in other
media, may be banned from the airwaves in order to protect
unwilling adults from momentary exposure to it in their
homes. 2 Making the sensitive judgments required in these
cases is not easy. But this responsibility has been reposed
initially in the Commission, and its judgment is entitled to
respect.
It is argued that rlcspite society's right to protect its children
from this kind of speech, and despite everyone's interest in not
being assaulted by offensive speech in the home, the Commis-sion's holding in this case is impermissible because it prevents
willing adults from listening to Carlin's monologue over the
radio in the early afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling
2 It is true that the radio listener ~Iuickly may tune out speech that is
offensive to him, In addition, broadca~ter~ may preface programs with
warnings as to their content. l3ut ~uch warnings do not help the unsus- ·
pecting listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this respect,
too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and records, which may
carry warning;; on thPJr faces, and from motion pictures and live performances, which may carry warnings on their marquees

..
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will have the effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ...
to [hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michi~
gan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not without
force. The Commission certainly should consider it as it
develops standards in this area. But it is not sufficiently
strong to leave the Commission powerless to act · in circum:stances such as those in thi~ case.
The Commi$sion's holding does not prevent willing adults
from purchasing Catlin's record, from attending his perform~
· ances, or, indeed, from rel'\qing the transcript reprinted as an
appendix ·to the Court's opinion. On its face, it does not pre..vent respondent from broaclcasting the monologue during late
evening hours when ·fewer children are likely to · be in the
audience, nor from broadcasting discu!:lsions of the contemporary use of laqguage at any time during the day. ·The Commission's holding, and certainly the Court's holding today,
does not speak to CllSes involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast, as
distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered
by respondent here. In short, I ~ree that on the facts of
this case, the Commission's order did not violate respondent's
F~rst Amendment rights.

II
As the foregoing demonstrates, my views are generally in
accord with what is said in Part IV (C) of MR. JusTICE
SrrEVENs' opinion. See ante, at 19-21. I therefore join that
portion of his opinion. I do not join Part IV (B) , however,
because I do not subs01;il:~e to the theory that the Justices of
this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is most
" valuable'' and hence deserving
of the most protection, and
I
wpich is less "valuable 1 ' {lnd hence deserving of less protection . Compare ante, at 15-18; Young v. American Mini
7'heatres, 427 U. S. 50, 64-73 (197(\) (opinion of STEVENS, J.),

•.

'

•.

• r
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with id., at 73 n. 1 (PowELL, J., concurring). 3 In my view,
the result in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have
more or less "val11e" than a candidate's campaign speech.
This is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the
judges to impose upon him.•
The result turr~s instead on the unique characteristics of the
broadcast media. combined with society's rjght to protect its
children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes.
Moreover, I doubt wlwther today's decision will prevent any
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's own
words from doing so, and from making for himself a value
judgment as to the merit of the message and words. Cf.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S .. at 77-79
(PowELL, J., concurring). "These are the grounds upon which
I join the judgment of the Court as to Part IV.

The Court has, however, created a limited exception to this rule in
order to bring commercial speech within the protection of the First AmendU. S. - , ment . See OhraLik v. Ohio State Bar Association, (1978).
4 For mnch the same reason, I also do not join Part IV (a).
I had not
thought that the application vel non of overbreadth analysis should depend
on the Court's judgment as to the value of the protected speech that might
be deterred. See ante, at 14-15. Except in the context of commercial
speech, sec Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380--381 (1977),
it has not in the past . See, e. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 1'30
(1974) ; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U . S. 518 (1972) .
As Mn .•Tm;1'ICE STEVENS points out, however, ante, at 6, Commission's
order was limited to the facts of this case; "it did not purport to engage
in formal rulemaking or in the promulgAtion of any regulations." In addition, since the Commission may be expected to proceed cautiously, as it
has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, I do not foresee an undue
"chilling " effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights . I ngree, therefore, thut respondent 's overbreadth rhallenge is meritless.
3
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I agree with MR. JusTICE STEWAR'l' that, under Hamling v..
United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), and United States v. 12
200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), the word 11 indecent" in 18 U. S. C. § 1464 must be construed to prohibit only
obscene speech. I would, therefore, normally refrain from
expressing my views on any constitutional issues implicated
in this case. However, I find the Court's misapplication of
fundamental First Amendment principles so pa.t ent, and its
attempt to impose its sadly myopic notions of propriety on
the wJtole of the American people so misguided, that I am
unable to remain silent.
I

'

'.,

' .•

For the second time in two years, see Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50 (1976), the Court refuses to
embrace the notion, completely antithetical to basic First
Amendment values, that the degree of protection the First
Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social
value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court.
See opinion of MR. JuSTICE PowELL, ante, a t - . Moreover,
as do all parties, all Members of the Court agree that the
Carlin monologue aired by Station WBAI does not fall within
one of the categories of speech, such as "fighting words,"
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), or
obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), that
,,'
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is totally without First Amendment protection. This conclusion, of course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding
that communications containing some of the words found
sanctionable here are fully protected by the First Amendment
in other contexts. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U. S. 697
· (1974); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S.
667 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis
v. New Orleans, 408 U. S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New
· Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971). Yet despite the Court's refusal to create a sliding
scale of First Amendment protection calibrated to this Court's
perception of the worth of a communication's content, and
despite our unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue
is protected speech, a majority of the CoQrt 1 nevertheless
finds tha.t, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not constitutionally barred from imposing sanctions on Pacificf.L for its
airing of the Carlin monologue. This majority apparently
believes that the FCC's disapproval of Pacifica's afternoon
broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words"' recording is a permissible
time, place, a.n d manner regulation. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77 (1949). Both the opinion of my Brother STEVENS
and the opinion of my Brother PowELL rely principally on
two factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the capacity of a
r~:~.dio broadcast to intrude into the unwilling listener's home,·
and (2) the presence of children in the listening audience.
Dispassionate analysis, removed from individual notions as
to what is proper and what is not, starkly rev~als that these
justifications, whether individually or together. simply do not
support even the professedly moderate degree of governmental
homogenization of radio communications-if, indeed, such
homogenization can ever be moderate given the pre-eminent
1 Where I critically refer undifferentiatingly to t.hc actions of "the
Court," my refen•nce is to this majority, which consists of my Brothers
PowELL and STEVENS and those Merpbers of the Court joining their
separate opinions.

77-528-DISSENT (A)
FCC v. PACIFICA FOUNDATION

status of the right of free speech
scheme-that the Court today permits.

111

our constitutional

A

Without question, the privacy interests of an individual
in his home are substantial and deserving of significant protection. In finding these interests sufficient to justify the
content regulation of protected speech, however, the Court
commits two errors. First. it misconceives the na.t ure of the
privacy interests involved where an individual voluntarily
chooses to admit radio communications into his home.
Second, it ignores the constitutionally protected interests of
both those who wish to transmit and those who desire to
receive broadcasts that many-induding the FCC ancl' this
Court-might find offensive.
"The ability of government, conso11ant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearingit is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial priVItCY
interests are being invaded· in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would. effectively·
empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter
of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, supra, at tl.
I am in wholehearted agreement with my brethren that all
individual's right "to be let alone" when engaged in private
activity within the confines of his own home is encompassed
within the "substantial privacy interests" to which Mr. Justice
Harian referred in Cohen, and is entitled to the greatest
solicitude. Stanley v. Georgia., 394 U. S. 557 (1969·). However, I believe that an individual's actions in switching on
and listening to communications transmitted over the publiC'.
airways and directed to the public at-large does not implicate
fundamental privacy interests, even when engaged in within
the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a publie
medium, these actions are more properly viewed .as a decision
to take part, if oniy as a. listener, in an ongoing public dis-

..
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course. See Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the Firs~
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 Va. L. Rev.
579, 618 (19'75). Although an individual's decision to allow
public radio communications into his home undoubtedly does
not abroga.t e all of his privacy interests, the residual privacy
interests he retains vis-a-vis the communication he voluntarily admits into his home are surely no greater than those
of the peo 1e present in the corridor of the Los An eles courthouse in o en w o ore witness to the words "Fuck the
1'5'iil't" emblazoned across Cohen's jacket. .Their privacy
interests were held insufficient to justify punishing CoheJl for
his offensive communication.
Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his home to
radio communications retains privacy interests of sufficient
moment to justify a ban on protected speech if those interests
are "invaded in an essentially intolerable manner," Cohen v.
California, supra, at 21, the very fact that those interests are
threatened only by a radio broadcast of itself precludes the
latter condition from being satisfied; for unlike other intrusive modes of communication, such as sound trucks, "[t]he
radio can be turnep off," Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U. S. 298, 302 (1974)-and with a minimum of effort.
As Judge Bazelon a.ptly observed below, "having elected to
receive public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an
offensive program is in the same position as the unsuspecting
passers-by in Cohen and Erznoznik [v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U. S. 205 ( 1975)]; he can avert his attention by changing
channels or turning otf the set." Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,
U. S. App. D. C . -, 556 F. 2d 9, 26 (1977). Whatever
the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he fipds offensive during the brief
interval before he can simply extend his arm ancl. switch stations or flick the "off" button. it is surely worth the candle
to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of
those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First

'·
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Amendment protection. 'ro reach a contra.r y balance, as
does the Court, is clearly, to follow MR. JusTICE STEVENS'
reliance on animal metaphors, ante, at 21, "to burn the house
to roast the pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383
(1957) .
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to a.ccord proper
weight to the interests of listeners who wish to h~ar broad~
casts the FCC deems offensive. It permits majoritarian tastes
completely to preclude a protected message from entering the
homes of a receptive, unoffended minority. No decision of
this Court supports such a result. Where the individuals
comprising the offended majority may freely choose to reject
the materia.l being offered, we have never found their privacy
interests of such moment to warrant the suppression of speech
on privacy grounds. Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, supra. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 3~7 U.S.
728 ( 1970) , relied on by the FCC and by the opinions of my
Brothers PowELL and S'I'EVENS, confirms rather than belies
this conclusion. In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute, 39
U. S. C. § 4009, permitting householders to require that mail
advertisers stop sending them lewd or offensive materials
and remove their names from mailing lists. Unlike the situa~
tion here, householders who wished to receive the sender's
communications were not prevented from doing so. Equal-ly
important, the determination of offensiveness Vf!l rton under
the statute involved i:p Rowan was completely within the
hands of the individual householder; no governmental evaluation of the worth of the mail's content stood between the
mailer and the househplder. In contrast, the visage of the
censor is all too discernable here.

'·
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Most parents will undoubtedly find understandable as well
as commendable the Court's sympathy with the FCC's desire
t o prevent offensive broadcasts from reaching the ears :.of
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unsupervised children. Unfortunately, the facial appeal of
this justification for radio censorship masks its constitutional
insufficiency. Although the government unquestionably has
a special interest in the well-being of children and consequently "can adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to
adults." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 212, see
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-107 (1973)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting), the Court has accounted for this
societal interest by adopting a "variable obscenity" standard
that permits the prurient appeal of material available to children to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). It is true that
the obscenity standard the Ginsberg Court adapted for such
materials was based on the then-applicable obscenity standard
of R,oth v. United States, supra, and Memoirs v. k(assachussetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), and that "[w]e have not had
occasion to decide what effect Miller [v. California, 413
U. S. 15 (1973)] will have on the Ginsberg formulation."
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 213 n. 10. Nevertheless, we have made it abundantly clear that "under any test
of obscenity as to minors ... to be obscene 'such expression
must be, in some significant wa.y, erotic.' Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15,20 (1971)." Ibid.
Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not an erotic
appeal to the prurient interests of children, the Court, for the
first time, allows the government to prevent minors from
gaining access to materials that are not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them. 2 It thus ignores our recent admonition that "[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor.
subject to some other legitima.te pros~ription cannot be supEven if the monologue appealed to the prurient interest of minor~,
it would not. be ob::<~ne as to them unless, as to them, "the work, taken
ns a whole, lack~ serious literary, artistic, po]itical, or scientific value:"
Miller v. f'alifornia,. 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973).
2
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pressed solely to protect the yollng from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitabl(;l for them." /d., at 213-214.:~
The Court's refusal to follow its own pronouncements i~
especially lamentable since it has the anomalous subsidiary
effect, at least in the radio context at issue here, of making
completely unavailable to adults material which may not
constitutionally be kept even from children. This result violates the principle of Butler v. Michigan, 35~ U. S. 380 ( 1957),
in spades. Butler involved a challenge to a. Michigan sta.tQte
that forbade the publication, sale, or distribution of print~d
material "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or
immoral acts, mimifestly tending to the corruption of the
morals of youth." 1d., at 381. Although Roth v. United
States, supra, had not yet been decided, it is at least arguable
that the material the statute in Butler was designed to suppress
constitutionally could have been. denied to children. Nevertheless, this Court found the statute unconstitutional. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Fra.nkfurter reasoned:
"The incidence of this ena.ctment is to reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children. It thereby arbitra.rily curtails one of those
liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history
has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free society." Butler v.
Michigan, supra, at 383-384.
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It may well be that. a narrowly drawn regulation prohibiting the use
of offensive language on broaqcasts directed specifically at. younger children constitutes one of the "other legitimate proscription[s]" aJ!uded to
in Erznoznik. This is so both because of the difficulties· inherent. in
adapting the Miller formulatiqn to communications received by young
children, and because such childr.en are "not possessed of that full capacity
Ior individual choice which is the presupposition of the First Amendment
·guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649-650 (1968)
(S·r~w .-\R'l', ,T., concurring).
3
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Where, as here, the goverument may not prevent the exposure
of minors to the suppressed material, the principle of Butler
applies a fortiori. The opinion of my Brother POWELL
acknowledges that there lurks in today's decision a potential
for 'reduc[ing] the adult population . .. to :[hearing] 011ly
what is fit for children,'" ante, at-, but expresses faith that
the FCC will vigilantly prevent this potential from ever
becoming a reality. I am f11.r less certain than my Brother
PowELL that such faith in the Commission is warranted, see
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F. 2d
397, 418-421 (statement of Bazelon, C. J., as to why he voted
to grant rehearing en bane); and even if I shared it, I could
not so easily shirk the responsibility assumed by each Member
of this Court with the donning of his robes jealously to guard
against encroachments on First Amendment freedoms.
In concluding that the presence of children in the listening
audience provides an adequate basis for the FCC to sanction
Pacifica's broadcast of the Carlin monologue over radio, the
opinions of my Brother PowELL, ante, at - , and my Brother
STEVENS, ante, at 20, both stress the time-honored right of a
parent to raise his child as he sees fit-a right this Court has
consistently been vigilant to protect. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
( 1925). Yet this principle supports a result directly contrary
to that reached by the Court. Yoder and Pierce hold that
pa.rents, not the government, haye the right to make certain
decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. · As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some
pa,.rents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude
towards the. seven "dirty words" healthy, and deem it desirable
to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Ca.rlin
defuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents may
constitute a minority of the American public, but the absence
·of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their
f(
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children in this fashion does not alter the right's nature or its
existence. Only the Court's regrettable decision does that:'

c
As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied on by
both the opinion of my Brother PowELL and the opinion of
my }3rother STEVENs-the intrusive nature of radio and the
presence of children in the listening audience-can, when taken
on its own terms, support the FCC's disapproval of the Carlin
monologue. These two asserted justifica.tions are further
plagued by a common failing: the lac-k of principled limits on
their use as a bl'l-sis for FCC censorship. No such limits come
readily to mind, and neither of the opinions comprising the
Court serve to clarify the extent to which the FCC may assert
the privacy and children-in-the-audience rationales as justification for expunging from the airways protected communications the Commission finds offensive. Taken to their logical
extreme, these rationales would support the cleansing of public
radio of any "four-letter" words whatsoever, regardless of their
context. The rationales could justify the banning from radio
of a myriad of literary works, novels, poems, and plays by the
likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Jonson. Henry
Fielding, Robert Burns, and Chaucer; they could support the
suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as the
Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for imposing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the
Bible .~
4 The opinions of my Brothers PowELL and STEVENS rightly refrain
from rE-lying on the notion of "spectrum scarcity" to support their result.
As Chief Judge Ba.zelon noted below, "although scarc.ity has justified
increasing the divE-rsity of speakers and spE-ech, it has never been held to
justify cen::;orship." 556 F . 2d, at. 29 (emphasis in original) . See Red
Lion Broadrasting Co . Y. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
~ seE', e g., I Samuel 52:22: "So and more also do God unto the ene{llies
of David, tf I lea.ve of all that. pertHin to him be the morning light any
1.ha.t pi~seth against the wall." ; 11 King:> 18:27 and Isaiah 36:12 : "[H]ath

}.
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In order to dispel the spectre of the possibility of so unpalatable a degree of censorship. and to defuse Pacifica's overbreadth challenge, the FCC insists that it desires only the
authority to reprimand a broadcaster on facts an~tlogous to
those present in this case, which it describes as involving
"broadcasting for nearly twelve minutes a record which repeated over and over words which depict sexual or excretory
activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by its
community's contemporary standards in the ea.rly afternoon
when children were in the audience." Brief for the Federal
Communcations Commission 45. The opillions of both my
Brother PowELL and my Brother STEVENS take the FCC at
its word, and consequently do no more than permit the Commission to censor the afternoon broadcast of the "sort of linguistic shock treatment," opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL,
ante, at - , involved here. To insure that the FCC's regu- .
lation of protected speech does not exceed these bounds, my
Brother PowELL is content to rely upon the judgment of the
Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems it prudent to
rely on this Court's ability accurately to assess the worth of
various kinds of speech.° For my own part, even accepting
he not ~ent me to thr mrn whirh ~it on t.h r wall, that they may eat their
own dung, and drink their own piRio' with you?"; Ezekiel 23:3: "And
t.hey committed whoredoms in Egrpt; the committed whorrdoms in their
youth ; there were thrir brem;tf' prcssrd. and t.here tlwy bruised the teats
of their virginity."; Ezekiel 2~ :21: "Thus tho calledst. to remembrance
the lewdnes of they youth in hrui~ing they trats by the Egyptians for the
pa.ps of thy yout.h." The Biblr (King Jame~; Version).
6 Although ultimately dependrnt. upon the outcome of review in this
Court, the approach taken by my Brother S·rEVENs would not appea.r to
tolerate the FCC's supprrR~ion of any :>prcch, such as political speech,
falling within t.h r corr area of First Amrndmcnt concern. The same,
however, cannot be said of thr approach taken by my Brother PowELL,
which, on its face, permits thr Commission to censor even political speech .
i~ it is sufficiently offensive to eommunity standards. A result more con-·
'tra.ry to rudimentary First. Amendment principle~ i::; difficult to imagine.
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that this case is limited to its facts.' I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worthless and offensive
communications from the public airways where it belongs and
where. until today, it resided; in a public free to choose those
communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace
unsullied by the censor's hand.
II
The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my Brothers
POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's censorship of the
Carlin monologue on the basis of two demonstrably inadequate
grounds is a function of their perception that the decision will
result in little, if any, curtailment of communicative exchanges
protected by the First Amendment. Although the extent to
which the Court stands ready to countenl:\nce FCC censorship
of protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find the
:r_:easoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC
censorstip they approve will not significantly infringe on First
Amendment values l~_£_!h disingenuoutas to reality ll!ld wrong
as a matter of law.
My Brother STEVENS. in reaching a result apologetically
described as narrow, ante, at 21, takes comfort in Eis observation that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided
1

7 Having insist«! that. it seeks to S<tnction radio communications only
in the limited circumstances present here, I bl'lieve that the FCC is
estopped from using either this decision or its own orders in this case,
56 F. C. C. 2d 94 (1975), and 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1967) , as a basis for
sanctioning nny public ra.dio bro11.dcru:t other than one aired during the
daytime or early evening and containing the relentletl$ repetition, for
longer than a. brief interval, of "languuge that describes, in terms patently
offensive as me11sured by contemporary community standards for the
bro11dcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs." 56 F. C. C.
2d, at 98. For surely broadca~;ters are not now on notice that. the Commission desires to regulate any offen;;ive broadcast, other than the type of
"linguistic shock treatment" condemned here, at any time, or even this
shock t.reatment. type of offensive broadcast during the late evening.
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will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communicatiou,'' ante, at 14 n. 18, and finds
solace in his conviction that "[t]here are few, if any, thoughts
tliiif'c annot be expressed by the use of less offensive language."
Ibid. The idea that the content of a message and its potential
impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the
words that are the vehicle for its expression is transpa.r ently
fallacious. A given word ma.y have a unique capa.c ity to
capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image.
Indeed, for those of us who pi~ an ap}~iately high.__v~e
on our cherished First Amendment righ ts. the word "censor"
is such a word. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court,
recognized the truism that a speaker's choice of words cannot
surgically be separated from the ideas he desires to express
when he warned that "we cannot iudulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen
v. California, supra, at 26. Moreover. even if a.n alternative
phrasing may communica.te a speaker's abstract ideas as effectively as those words he is forbidden to use. it is doubtful
that the stcrlized message will convey the emotion that is an
essential part of so many conmlUnications. This. too, was
apparent to Mr. Justice Harlan and the Court i11 Cohen.
"[W]e cannot overlook the fact. because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here. tha.t much linguistic
expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.
In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force. We cannot sallction the view
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which. practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communica,ted." !d., at 25-26.
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My Brother STEVENS also finds relevant to his First Amendment analysis the fact that "[a]dults who feel the need may
purchase tapes and records or go to theatres and nightclubs
to hear [the tabooed] words." Ante, at 21 n. 27. My
.Brother PowELL agrees: "The Commission's holding does not
prevent willing adult8 from purchasing Carlin's record, from
attending his performances, or. indeed. from reading the
trranscript reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion."
Ante, at - . The opinions of my Brethren display both a
'' sad insens.itivityJo the fact that these alternatives involve
the expenditure of money. time, and effort that many of those
wishing the hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to
afford. and a ·;1aive innocence~'of the reality that in many
cases, the medium may well be the message.
The Court apparently believes that the FCC's actions here
can be analogized to the zoning ordinances upheld in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, supra. For two reasons, it is
wrong. First. the zoning ordinances found to pass constitutional muster in Young had valid goals other than the channeling of protected speech. !d., at 71 n. 34 (opinion of
STEVENS. J.); id., at 80 (PowELL, J.. concurring). No such
goals are present here. Second, and crucial to the opinions
of my Brothers PowELL and STEVENS in Young--opinions,
which, as they do in this case, supply the ~re five-person
majority of the Court-the ordinances did not restrict the
a~ of distributors or exhibitors to the market or impair
the viewing public's access to the regulated material. !d., at
62, 71 11. 35 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 77 (POWELL, J.,
concurring). Again, this is not the situation here. Both
those desiring to receive Carlin 's message over the radio and
those wishing to send it to them are prevented from doing so
by the Commission's actions. Although, as my Brethren
}!>Oint out, Carlin's message may be disseminated or received
by other means. this is of little consolation to those broadcasters and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least
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among them financial. do not have access to, or cannot take
advantage of, these other means.
Moreover, it is doubtful that even those frustrated liseteners
in a position to follow my Brother PowELL's gratuitous ad::.!£.e and attend one of Carlin's performances or purchase one
of his records would receive precisely the same message Pacifica's radio station sent its audience. The airways are cap'
able not only of carrying
a message, but also of transforming
it. A satirist's monologue may be most potent when delivered
to a live audience; yet the choice whether this will in fact
be the manner in which the message is delivered and received
is one the First Amendment prohibits the government from
making.

.,

III
It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an effort
to reshape its fabric to cover the patent!~ wrong result the
Court reaches in this case d~tn~erous as well ,!S !!mentable.
Yet there runs throughout t e opinions of my l1rothers
PowELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally disturbing: a
degtessing inabiljty to appre~ that in our land of cultural
plura"mm, "there are many who think, act, ~nd talk differently
from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their
fragil~bilities. It is only an acute ethnocen'tric myopia
I! K$1 ..-- - ~a
~
sr
•
that ena es the Court to approve me censorsiiip of communications solely because of the words they contain.
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is
the skin of a living thought and may va~y greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 1 425 (1918)
(Holmes, J.). The words that the Court and the Commission find so unpalatable may be the stuff of everyday conversations in some, if not many. of the innumerable subcultures
that comprise this Nation. Academic research indicates that
this is indeed the case. See Jackson, Get Your Ass in the

I
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Water and Swim Like Me (1974); Dillard, Black English
(1972); Labov, Language in the Inner City: Studies in the
Black English Vernacular (1972). As one researcher concluded, " [ w ]ords generally considered obscene like 'bullshit'
and 'fuck' are considered neither obs·cene nor derogatory in the
[black] vernacular e;xcept in pl;\rticuljlr contextual situations
and when used with certain intonations." Bins, "Toward an
Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry," Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5
(Georgetown University Press 1972).
Today's decision will thus hltve its greatest impact on listening audiences comprised of persons who do not share the Court's
view as to which words or !'lXpressiops are acceptable and who,
for a variety of reasons, including l1 conscious desire to flout
majoritarian conventions, express themselves using words tqat
may be regarded as offensive by those from different socioeconomic b;:tckgrounds, and on broadcasters desiring to reach
such audiences. 8 In this context, the Court's decision may
be seen for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those
groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of
thinking, acting, and speaking. See Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, '· 506-511 (1977) ca~)<JNNAN, J., concurring).
Pacifica, in response to an FCC inquiry about its broadcast
of Carlin's satire on "the words you couldn't say on the public
airwaves." explained that "Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, ~e is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words.'' 56 F. C. C.
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sUnder t.he approach taken by my Brother PowELL, the availability of
br<;>adcasts about groups whose members comprit;e such audiences might
also be affected, Both news broadcao;ts about. activities involving these
groups and public affairs broadcat'ts about, their concerns are apt to cont11in
interviews, statement<~, or remarks by group leaders and members which
may contain offensive language to an extent my Brother PowELL finda
unacceptable.
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' 2d, at - . In confirming Carlin's prescience as a. social commentator by the result it reaches today, the Court evinces an
attitude towards the "seven dirty words'' that many others
besides Mr. Carlin and Pacifica might describe as "silly."
Whether today's decision will similarly prove ''harmless"
remains to be see. One ca.n only hope that it will.
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